The criminal justice system is built on the sacred principle that no innocent person should ever be punished, especially not with the irreversible punishment of death. Yet, the case of Ankush Maruti Shinde v. State of Maharashtra stands as a stark reminder that even the highest courts can sometimes commit grave errors.
This case is a tragic saga of how six poor, illiterate labourers belonging to a nomadic tribal community were falsely implicated, wrongfully convicted, and sentenced to death – only to be finally declared innocent after spending more than a decade in jail.
The criminal justice system is founded on the solemn principle that no innocent person should ever be punished, particularly not with the irreversible sentence of death. Yet the tragic saga of Ankush Maruti Shinde v. State of Maharashtra stands as one of the most disturbing examples in Indian judicial history of how this principle can sometimes be forgotten.
It is a case where six poor, illiterate labourers from a nomadic tribal community were falsely implicated, wrongfully convicted, and condemned to death—only to be declared innocent more than a decade later after the Supreme Court finally revisited the matter.
The incident in question allegedly occurred on the night of 5 June 2003 in Nashik District, Maharashtra. According to the prosecution, a gang of 7–8 unknown persons entered the Satote family hut, committed armed dacoity, brutally assaulted the family members, gang-raped a young woman Savita, and murdered five persons. The crime shook public conscience and created enormous pressure on the police to find the culprits at any cost. However, despite intensive efforts, the police were unable to trace the real offenders. Faced with public outrage and institutional pressure to “solve” the case, the investigating machinery picked up six innocent daily-wage labourers belonging to a marginalized nomadic tribe and implicated them in a sensational case of murder, gang rape, and dacoity, even though there was virtually no reliable evidence to connect them with the crime. Scientific material such as DNA and forensic reports did not support the prosecution version, but these exculpatory facts were never placed before the Court.
Ignoring these serious deficiencies, the Sessions Judge, Nashik, by judgment and order dated 12 June 2006, convicted all six accused and sentenced each of them to death. The extreme poverty and vulnerability of the accused, the lack of scientific evidence, and the contradictions in the identification evidence were not given due consideration.
The matter then reached the Bombay High Court. :- A Division Bench comprising Justice B.H. Marlapalle and Justice R.S. Mohite, by judgment dated 22 March 2007, confirmed the conviction. Three accused – Ankush Maruti Shinde, Rajya Shinde, and Raju Mhasu Shinde – were sentenced to death, while the remaining three were awarded life imprisonment. Even though the case was based almost entirely on shaky identification evidence and even though forensic material failed to connect the accused to the crime, the High Court did not grant the benefit of doubt that is constitutionally mandated in capital punishment cases.
Thereafter the matter reached the Supreme Court. In 2009 in the matter of Ankush Maruti Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 667, a Two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Dr. Arijit Pasayat and Justice Dr. Mukundakam Sharma allowed the State’s appeal, upheld the conviction of the accused, and confirmed the death sentence. The Bench concluded that the accused were guilty of rape and murder, describing their conduct as cruel, brutal, and diabolical. The appeals filed by the accused challenging their conviction were accordingly dismissed. Thus, on the basis of unreliable and legally inadmissible evidence and without meaningful scientific corroboration, six innocent poor men were pushed to the brink of execution by the highest court of the country and moreparticularly by Justice Dr. Arijit Pasayat and Justice Dr. Mukundakam Sharma.
Nearly ten years later, the truth finally came to light. In Ankush Maruti Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 15 SCC 470, a larger Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Hon’ble Justices M.R. Shah, A.K. Sikri, and S. Abdul Nazeer re-examined the entire matter. Upon a fresh and comprehensive re-appraisal of the record, the Bench discovered that the prosecution case was riddled with contradictions, that the Test Identification Parade was unreliable and delayed, that crucial exculpatory material had been suppressed, and that scientific and forensic evidence did not connect the accused to the offence. Most significantly, it emerged that the key eyewitness had initially identified completely different persons from police photographs—a fact that had never been disclosed during the original trial. The larger Bench came to the inescapable conclusion that the six accused had been falsely implicated and that their conviction was a grave miscarriage of justice. All six were accordingly acquitted. Recognizing the irreversible harm caused by their wrongful incarceration, the Supreme Court directed payment of ₹30 lakhs as compensation and ordered an inquiry into the conduct of the concerned police officials, while also directing further investigation to trace the real offenders.
This case painfully illustrates how vulnerable and marginalized persons can become easy victims of dishonest and motivated police officers, and also exposes the disturbing manner in which some judges of the High Courts and even the Supreme Court deal with cases involving the poor—going to the extent of pronouncing the death penalty without due caution. Such grave errors occur either because the concerned judges do not properly appreciate the correct legal position, or because they fail to apply the law faithfully for extraneous reasons, which may include institutional bias, external influence, corruption, or a misplaced desire to project themselves as “strict judges” for the sake of publicity or public acclaim.
Under the law, police officers who fabricate evidence, produce bogus witnesses, or deliberately implicate innocent persons in capital offences, as well as the public prosecutors who knowingly support such false cases, are liable to be prosecuted under Sections 192, 193, 194, 211, 120-B, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, which prescribe punishment equivalent to the offence falsely alleged. Likewise, State officials who grant sanction for filing frivolous appeals before the Supreme Court and obtain orders of death sentence by misusing public money must also be held personally accountable in accordance with law.
Further, the amount of compensation paid to persons who were falsely implicated and wrongfully prosecuted should, as a matter of legal principle, be recovered from the concerned delinquent public servants—including the erring investigating officers, prosecutors, and any other officials found responsible for the miscarriage of justice. The principle of personal accountability of public authorities for violation of fundamental rights has been firmly established in several authoritative decisions, including Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 8 SCC 1; S. Nambi Narayanan v. Siby Mathews, (2018) 10 SCC 804; Union of India v. Pirthwi Singh, (2018) 16 SCC 363; Union of India v. Sudipta Lahiri, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 326; State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, (2024) 6 SCC 461; LDA v. M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243; Walmik Bobde v. State of Maharashtra, 2001 ALL MR (Cri) 1731; Directions in the Matter of Demolition of Structures, In re, (2025) 5 SCC 1; Bharat Devdan Salvi v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 42; Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj v. Attorney General of Trinidad & Tobago, (1978) 2 WLR 902; McLeod v. St. Aubyn, [1899] AC 549; Luis Hens Serena v. Spain, 2008 SCC OnLine HRC 20; Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 288; and Parashuram Detaram Shamdasani v. King-Emperor, [1945] A.C. 264.
A far more serious issue arises with respect to the manner in which the conviction and death sentence of innocent persons came to be affirmed at multiple judicial levels. The Sessions Judge at Nashik, the Bombay High Court Bench comprising Justice (Retd.) B.H. Marlapalle and Justice (Retd.) R.S. Mohite, and subsequently the Supreme Court Bench comprising Justice (Retd.) Arijit Pasayat and Justice (Retd.) Mukundakam Sharma, all confirmed the death sentence without adequately applying the mandatory legal standards governing the appreciation of evidence in capital punishment cases. Accordingly, since it is proved that the orders were passed in conscious disregard of binding legal standards and resulted in deliberate violation of fundamental rights, the accused judges would be liable to be proceeded against in accordance with law, including under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code such as Sections 194, 219, 166, 120-B, 34, and 107 IPC, which deal with fabrication of false evidence, corrupt judicial acts, abuse of official power, criminal conspiracy, common intention, and abetment by act of commission and omission.
Under criminal law, when false implication and fabrication of evidence by investigating officers are established, all those including the concerned Judges, who knowingly support or act in furtherance of such unlawful actions become liable under the doctrine of conspiracy.
In Raman Lal v. State, 2001 Cri LJ 800, it has been held that where a person is falsely implicated through abuse of judicial process, all participants in such illegality can be held accountable. Relying upon Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, (1980) 2 SCC 465, the Court observed:
“Since it is impossible to adduce direct evidence of conspiracy, the offence can only be proved largely from the inference drawn from acts or illegal omissions committed by the conspirators in furtherance of a common design. Once such a conspiracy is proved, the act of one conspirator becomes the act of the others. A co-conspirator who joins subsequently and commits overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy must also be held liable.”
Where judicial orders are passed in blatant disregard of binding legal principles and result in violation of fundamental rights, such actions attract the doctrine of legal malice. The law is well settled that violation of rights through unlawful orders cannot be justified on the plea of innocent mistake. In Sama Aruna v. State of Telangana, (2018) 12 SCC 150, the Supreme Court explained the concept of malice in law in the following terms:
“A person who inflicts an injury upon another in contravention of law is not allowed to say that he did so with an innocent mind; he is taken to know the law and must act within the law. He may, therefore, be guilty of malice in law, although, so far as the state of his mind is concerned, he acted ignorantly and in that sense innocently.”
Furthermore, passing orders in clear violation of established legal standards may attract liability under Section 219 of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with corrupt or malicious judicial acts contrary to law. When a death sentence is imposed without adherence to mandatory safeguards laid down by the Supreme Court, such orders fall within the category of unlawful judicial action causing grave prejudice to citizens.
Earlier Misconduct of Justice (Retd.) Shri Arijit Pasayat: Unlawful Detention of Zahira Sheikh – makes him liable for punishment for Offences Under Sections 219 and 220 IPC
Justice (Retd.) Shri Arijit Pasayat has, in multiple instances, committed serious judicial illegality and misuse of power. A striking example is the case of Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC 374, where he imposed a sentence of one year’s imprisonment for contempt of court, despite the fact that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 expressly prescribes a maximum punishment of only six months.
The sentence exceeding six months was therefore ex facie illegal, beyond jurisdiction, and void in law, rendering Zahira Sheikh’s detention for the additional period of six months wholly unlawful. Such action squarely attracts liability under Sections 219 and 220 of the Indian Penal Code, which deal with corrupt or malicious judicial acts and wrongful confinement by persons acting in a judicial capacity.
This punishment was in direct violation of Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India, which categorically prohibits the imposition of any penalty greater than that prescribed by law at the time of the offence. Even if the contempt jurisdiction was purportedly exercised under Article 129 of the Constitution, it could not override the constitutional prohibition contained in Article 20(1). The same safeguard is also guaranteed under Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which forbids the imposition of a heavier penalty than what was legally applicable.
In Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 and Pallav Seth v. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549, the Supreme Court has unequivocally ruled that punishment not provided under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 cannot be imposed by the Supreme Court itself. This position was further reinforced in Vijay Singh v. State of U.P., (2012) 5 SCC 242, where it was held that “punishment not prescribed under statutory rules cannot be imposed.”
Consequently, the one-year sentence imposed in Zahira Sheikh’s case was unconstitutional, arbitrary, and a clear instance of unlawful exercise of judicial power, amounting to a grave violation of personal liberty and the rule of law.
The principle that no authority—whether executive or judicial—is above accountability for violation of constitutional rights is central to the rule of law. When innocent persons suffer wrongful conviction and years of incarceration due to systemic failure, the law mandates not only compensation to the victims but also appropriate accountability for those responsible.
Above all, the story of the Ankush Maruti Shinde case teaches that while judicial errors can occur even at the highest level, the strength of the justice system ultimately lies in its ability to acknowledge mistakes and restore justice, however late it may be. The lives lost and the years stolen from six innocent men remain a solemn warning that in matters of life and death, the law can never afford to be casual, mechanical, or indifferent to doubt.
