Following the Supreme Court’s recent observations, counsel for Advocate Ravi Jadhav along with Adv. Nilesh Ojha, Chairman of the Indian Bar Association, have called for registration of criminal cases and strict action against those allegedly responsible for deliberately causing delays that prevented eight advocates from contesting the Bar Council elections.
Direct Disobedience of directions of the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court — An advocates’ group is set to file a contempt petition before the Supreme Court against Retd. Justice K. R. Shriram, alleging that the disqualification of candidates was ordered in direct violation and contempt of the Constitution Bench judgment in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 and other binding directions.
It is contended that the decision was passed in undue haste, without issuing notice to eight advocates and without awaiting compliance with the Supreme Court’s directions and the requisite amendments by the Bar Council of India, thereby amounting to a serious breach of settled constitutional principles and judicial mandates.
Citing established legal principles, it has been emphasized that actions taken in undue haste cannot be sustained in law. Referring to NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. v. NOIDA (2011) 6 SCC 508, it was pointed out that the Supreme Court has held that undue haste amounts to arbitrariness, and leads to an inference of malafides and reuires CBI investigation to find out the exact reason behind such undue haste.
A significant observation by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) Diary No. 15116/2026 dated 16.03.2026, filed by Advocate Ravi Jadhav, has provided a strong legal foundation for potential compensation claims and further legal proceedings against those responsible for the alleged exclusion of candidates from the Bar Council election process.
The Court’s observation—that the petitioner had a valid claim to contest but relief could not be granted due to the advanced stage of the election—has triggered serious questions regarding the legality of earlier decisions and the accountability of authorities involved.
The observations made by the Supreme Court in the alleged irregularities in the Bar Council election have now become a direct noose around the neck of those in authority and the concerned officials. In Advocate Ravi Jadhav’s petition, the Court clearly stated that “the candidature was valid,” but relief could not be granted as the election had reached an advanced stage.
What does this mean? The Court has acknowledged that an injustice occurred, but relief was denied due to the passage of time.
This observation has given the entire matter a new legal dimension. Since the Court has recognised the validity of the candidature, the earlier decisions excluding candidates from the election process have now come under serious legal doubt.
Advocates have raised concerns that such actions not only violated principles of natural justice but also resulted in irreversible prejudice, particularly when the subsequent developments indicated that the candidates were, in fact, eligible.
The Supreme Court’s observations have thus shifted the focus from mere procedural issues to substantive accountability, raising the larger question—
If the claim was valid, who is responsible for denying the right at the crucial stage?
Clear Supreme Court Order — Yet Rules Not Amended!
Adv. Nilesh Ojha pointed out that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by its order dated 19.02.2026 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 226 of 2026, had expressly directed the Bar Council of India to amend the relevant rules within one week and remove unlawful conditions. Accordingly, 26 February 2026 was the final deadline.
However, even after the expiry of this deadline, no amendments were carried out. This has led to serious allegations that the Supreme Court’s direct order was not implemented — not merely as an administrative lapse, but as a potential violation of binding judicial directions. It is well settled that orders of the Supreme Court are not advisory but mandatory in nature, and failure to comply may amount to wilful disobedience.
The failure to amend the rules within the stipulated time appears not to be a mere oversight, but a conscious disregard of the Court’s directions, giving rise to the possibility of contempt proceedings.
Impact on the Election Process
This delay had a direct and adverse impact on the election process. Several eligible candidates — particularly the eight advocate-candidates — were denied the opportunity to contest. It is strongly contended that, had the rules been amended in time, these candidates would have been able to participate in the election.
“Delay” or a “Deliberate Design”?
In legal circles, a serious debate has emerged as to whether this was merely a procedural delay or a deliberate design to exclude certain candidates. It is being suggested that candidates who were reportedly enjoying significant support across the State may have been particularly affected.
“All Responsible” — Strong Warning
A strong position has now been taken that all those whose acts or omissions resulted in the denial of electoral rights — including officials, members, and other concerned persons — will be equally liable.
Injustice to Eight Advocates — Accountability Now Demanded
Along with Advocate Ravi Jadhav, the list of other advocates who were allegedly unfairly excluded from the election process is equally startling. This is not a case of injustice to a single individual; rather, it indicates that the integrity of the entire process has been compromised.
Adv. Ravi Prakash Jadhav (Mumbai), Adv. Prasad Naik (Goa), Adv. Sanjay Tejmal Jain (Yavatmal), Adv. Sagar Chitre (Jalgaon), Adv. Prakash Jagtap (Kalyan), Adv. Janaki D. Godhamgaonkar (Nanded), Adv. Asif Naqvi (Mumbai), Adv. Poonam Vijaykumar Bodkepatil (Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar), and Adv. Sanjay Kolhapure (Dadar, Mumbai) were all kept out of the electoral fray.
Following the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment that the candidature was valid, the injustice suffered by these advocates has now come to light, and a full accountability is expected to be demanded from the concerned authorities.
Legal Representation and Support
In this matter, Adv. Ravi Jadhav and Adv. Prakash Jagtap are being represented by Adv. Nilesh Ojha, Adv. Vijay Kurle, Adv. Partho Sarkar, Adv. Tanveer Nizam, and Adv. Ishwarlal Agarwal, who are handling the legal proceedings. They are backed by the strong support of hundreds of advocates.
The developments have significantly intensified the legal battle, with the possibility of contempt proceedings, criminal investigations, and compensation claims gaining strength.
Who are the “Co-Conspirators”? Possible Action Against Advocates
In this matter, the allegations are not limited to the authority that passed the order, but also extend to those who allegedly facilitated or enabled it. In particular, the roles of Adv. Sameer Vaidya and Adv. Syed Ejaz Abbas have come under scrutiny.
It is alleged that, despite a clear duty, they failed to draw the Court’s attention to the binding principles laid down in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), and further assisted in securing an order against the affected advocate-candidates without issuance of notice, thereby contributing to an allegedly unlawful outcome.
In this backdrop, legal circles indicate that contempt proceedings as well as other forms of legal liability may be invoked against the concerned advocates.
On behalf of the affected candidates, reliance is being placed on established precedents, including:
- Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. v. ICI India Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 74
- Sajid Khan Moyal v. State of Rajasthan, 2014 SCC OnLine Raj 1450
- Baduvan Kunhi v. K.M. Abdulla, 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 23602
- Lal Bahadur Gautam v. State of U.P., (2019) 6 SCC 441
- Heena Nikhil Dharia v. Kokilaben K. Nayak, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 9859
Relying on these judgments, preparations are reportedly underway to initiate:
Contempt of Court proceedings
Other criminal and legal actions
Further developments are awaited as the matter progresses.
Serious Questions Raised on the High Power Committee
The candidates have raised serious concerns, alleging that the High Power Committee headed by Retd. Justice K. R. Shriram acted in undue haste by cancelling the candidature of eight advocates without awaiting the decision of the Bar Council of India and without granting them an opportunity of hearing. It is contended that such action amounts to a clear violation of the fundamental principles of natural justice and fair procedure.
“Undue Haste Equals Arbitrariness” — Settled Law of the Supreme Court
In this context, the Supreme Court in NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. v. NOIDA (2011) 6 SCC 508 has clearly laid down the law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“Undoubtedly, the respondent no.4 is guilty of proceeding in haste and that amounts to arbitrariness.”
It further observed that:
“…when a thing is done in a post-haste manner, mala fide would be presumed.”
In Zenit Mataplast Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 10 SCC 388, the Court held:
“Anything done in undue haste can also be termed as arbitrary and cannot be condoned in law.”
Thus, it is a settled position that actions taken in undue haste are inherently arbitrary and raise a presumption of mala fide. Applying these principles, the “hurried order” in the present case itself becomes a matter of serious legal concern.
Legal experts contend that this is not merely a procedural lapse, but a direct violation of the Principles of Natural Justice and the binding guidelines laid down by the Constitution Bench in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.
At the heart of the issue is the fundamental principle of “audi alteram partem” (hear the other side). The Constitution Bench in Maneka Gandhi clearly held that no order affecting the rights of a person can be passed without granting them an opportunity of being heard. However, in the present case, it is alleged that no notice was issued to the eight candidates, they were denied a chance to present their case, and their candidature was cancelled outright. This has intensified allegations that the order is unconstitutional and legally unsustainable.
According to reliable sources, preparations are now underway to initiate civil contempt proceedings under Sections 2(b) and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The proposed petition is expected to raise serious grounds, including violation of binding Constitution Bench directions, disobedience of Supreme Court orders, breach of natural justice principles, deliberate disregard of judicial procedure, and infringement of fundamental rights.
The legal position has also been reinforced by the Constitution Bench judgment in Re: Justice C.S. Karnan (2017) 7 SCC 1, where the Supreme Court categorically held that no judge or judicial officer is above the law, and that contempt action can be initiated even against members of the judiciary in case of wilful disobedience of court orders.
Applying these principles, the order passed by Retd. Justice K. R. Shriram is now under serious legal scrutiny, with the possibility of contempt proceedings and further action gaining momentum.
Possibility of Criminal Liability
In legal circles, there is now a serious discussion regarding the applicability of provisions akin to Section 219 IPC (now corresponding provisions under BNS). Under these provisions, if a public servant or judicial officer knowingly passes an order contrary to law, it may attract direct criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, the developments in the present case have raised the possibility of not only contempt proceedings but also criminal liability against those responsible.
As discussions intensify, this case is increasingly being seen as a potential turning point in ensuring transparency, fairness, and accountability in Bar Council elections.
At the centre of the controversy is the role of the High Power Committee headed by Justice (Retd.) K. R. Shriram, which is now facing intense scrutiny from sections of the legal fraternity for allegedly acting in undue haste and passing orders with civil consequences without affording a proper opportunity of hearing to the affected parties?
Several advocates have raised a pointed question — if the person heading the Committee does not appear to possess even a basic understanding of the foundational rule that no order carrying civil consequences can be passed against a person who has not been heard, how can such a person be entrusted with the chairmanship of a High Power Committee? The principle of audi alteram partem — that no one shall be condemned unheard — is not a technicality but a cornerstone of the rule of law, and its alleged breach at the very highest level of the Committee’s functioning has drawn sharp and sustained criticism?
In this context, advocates have drawn attention to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Supdt. of Central Excise v. Somabhai Ranchhodhbhai Patel, (2001) 5 SCC 65, wherein the Court emphasised that the level of understanding and competence of a judge has a direct and material bearing on the rights of litigants who appear before the court, since judicial orders and decisions profoundly affect their legal rights, liberties and interests? The implication drawn by critics is self-evident — a decision-maker who is insensible to a rule as elementary as audi alteram partem is not equipped to adjudicate upon matters that touch the civil rights of affected persons?
The criticism finds further constitutional grounding in the celebrated ruling of the Constitution Bench in Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600, where a Five-Judge Bench held in the clearest terms that it is wholly improper and undesirable to expose precious rights — including the rights of life, liberty and property — to the vagaries of individual whims and fancies, and that individuals do not become wise merely because they occupy high seats of power, good sense and fairness not being attributes that accompany a post, however exalted?
The Constitution Bench further observed that the presumption of a high sense of responsibility in those who hold high office is neither a legal nor a rational presumption — it is, at best, a complaisant assumption unsupported by history and unwarranted by reality? In a society pledged to uphold the rule of law, the Bench held, it is both unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of civic life to be governed by individual discretion when it can conveniently be brought within the discipline of the rule of law? The so-called “high authority” theory — which would insulate powerful decision-makers from scrutiny on the ground of their eminence — was, the Court recorded, noticed for its unrealistic pretensions and buried accordingly, without even so much as an ode to it?
Applied to the present controversy, critics contend that the conduct of the High Power Committee headed by Justice (Retd.) K. R. Shriram is a textbook illustration of precisely the kind of arbitrary exercise of power that the Constitution Bench warned against — and that the invocation of high office cannot, either legally or morally, substitute for the observance of the most elementary norms of natural justice?
The criticism does not rest on the present controversy alone? Certain past orders passed by Justice (Retd.) Shriram are also being placed under scrutiny by members of the legal fraternity, who contend that they reflect a pattern of approach that raises serious questions about his understanding of foundational principles of law — questions that, in their submission, go to the root of his suitability to head a body exercising powers with civil consequences over the rights and careers of affected persons?
It is in this backdrop that a section of advocates has now addressed a request to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, urging that Justice (Retd.) K. R. Shriram be relieved of his position as Chairman of the High Power Committee and that any other suitable and competent person be appointed in his place? The advocates contend that the integrity and credibility of the Committee’s proceedings — and the protection of the rights of those who appear before it — demand nothing less than a decision-maker who is alive to the basic requirements of law, procedure and natural justice, and in whose impartiality and competence all stakeholders can repose genuine confidence?
The Supervisory Committee headed by Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia has not escaped criticism either? While the Supervisory Committee occupies a position of oversight precisely so that errors and illegalities at the level of the High Power Committee may be identified and corrected, critics contend that it has failed to discharge this function? Rather than stepping in to rectify a situation that was, on the face of the record, legally untenable, the Supervisory Committee is alleged to have allowed the exclusion of the eight candidates to continue — an outcome that has caused real and ongoing prejudice to persons whose rights were never properly considered? The more judicious and legally defensible course, in the submission of critics, would have been for the Supervisory Committee to direct the Bar Council of India to take an immediate decision on the matter and to admit the names of the affected candidates provisionally, thereby protecting their rights pending a final and properly reasoned determination? The failure to adopt this course has, critics argue, compounded the original illegality and extended its consequences — transforming what ought to have been a correctable procedural error into a sustained denial of opportunity that the supervisory machinery of the Committee structure was designed precisely to prevent?