Justice Vishwanathan reminded Lord Denning.
New Delhi: The India Bar Association has endorsed and appreciated the restraint, compassion and judicial maturity shown by Hon’ble Justice K.V. Viswanathan after a petitioner appearing in person threw papers towards the Supreme Court Bench and shouted an obscene abuse inside the courtroom.
The dramatic incident occurred when the petitioner, identified as Prabal Pratap, appeared before the Bench in a Special Leave Petition. After confirming his identity, the Court permitted him to make his submissions.
The petitioner addressed the Judge as a “judicial servant” and said:
“Judicial Servant, I order you to order the registration of FIR against ACP Vikas Nagar, Lucknow and Duplex Technologies Services for running cybercrime syndicate across the country.”
Justice Viswanathan immediately asked:
“You’re ordering us?”
The petitioner responded:
“I am the sovereign.”
He claimed that the entire material appeared in 155 pages forming part of the record. Moments later, he abruptly threw the papers in his possession towards the Bench. Security personnel immediately restrained him and removed him from the courtroom. While being taken away, the petitioner shouted a highly offensive Hindi abuse.
Despite this serious breach of courtroom discipline, Justice Viswanathan did not react with anger. He did not direct the registration of a criminal case or initiate contempt proceedings merely to vindicate the authority of the Bench.
When Senior Advocate P.S. Patwalia remarked that the difficulty of a judge’s job becomes more visible on certain days, Justice Viswanathan reportedly observed:
“He is very disturbed… it’s all frustration. We only have sympathies for him.”
The Judge thereafter clarified that the Court did not propose to take any action against the petitioner. The Bench independently examined the record, and decided the petition of said person and as found no good ground to interfere with the impugned order and dismissed the Special Leave Petition on merits.
The India Bar Association considers this response a striking example of judicial temperament. Justice Viswanathan maintained courtroom order without personalising the attack. He separated the petitioner’s objectionable conduct from the merits of his case and refused to allow personal provocation to influence the judicial outcome.
The Lord Denning parallel
Justice Viswanathan’s conduct recalls a widely narrated courtroom incident involving Lord Denning, one of England’s most celebrated judges.
In article titled Article published by Hon’ble Justice Markandey Katju in CRLJ 2007 [AIR 2007(March Part)] titled as “Contempt of Court: The Need for A Fresh Look,” quoted the incident of Lord Denning as under;
The relevant paras from the said article by Justice Markandey Katju are extracted below;
“An interesting example of this is given by Lord Denning in his Book “The Due Process of Law” at page 6 were he writes :
“On every Monday morning we hear litigants in person. Miss Stone was often there. She made an application before us. We refused it. She was sitting in the front row with a book-case within her reach. She picked up one of Butterworth’s ‘Workmen’s Compensation Cases’ and threw it at us. It passed between Lord Justice Diplock and me. She picked up another. That went wide too. She said, ‘I am running out of ammunition’. We took little notice. She had hoped we would commit her for Contempt of Court — just to draw more attention to herself. As we took no notice, she went towards the door. She left saying : ‘I congratulate your Lordships on your coolness under fire’.”
The Article reads thus;
“In a democracy, on the other hand, it is the people who are supreme, and therefore they are the superior entity, while all State authorities (including Judges) are inferior entities, being the servants of the people.
Hence in a democracy there is no need for Judges to vindicate their authority or display majesty or pomp. Their authority will come from the public confidence, and this in turn will be an outcome of their own conduct, their integrity, impartiality, learning and simplicity. No other vindication is required in a democracy by Judges, and there is no need for them to display majesty and authority.
Looking at it from this angle one can immediately realize that in a democracy the purpose of the Contempt of Court power can only be to enable the Court to function. The power is not to prevent the master (the people) from criticizing their servant (the Judges) if the latter do not function properly or commit misconduct.
In my opinion once it is accepted that India is a democracy, and that in a democracy the people are supreme, the reconciliation can only be affected by treating the right of the citizens of free speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) to be primary, and the power of contempt to be subordinate. In other words, the people are free, and have the right to criticize Judges, but they should not go to the extent of making the functioning of the judiciary impossible or extremely difficult.
Thus the concept of ‘scandalizing’ the Court has changed. In earlier times a person who called a Judge a fool in England would certainly be hauled up for contempt; today he would not. And the reasons for this change is, as Lord Salmon has pointed out, that today the contempt power is not used for vindicating the authority of the Judge but only for enabling him to function.
If for instance, a person keeps shouting or whistling in my Court repeatedly, and does not stop despite my repeated requests, obviously I will have to take some action to enable me to function. After all people are paying taxes from which I get my salary and perks, and I have to justify this salary by deciding their disputes. Similarly, if someone threatens a party or witness in a case, I will certainly take action. But if a person calls me a fool, whether inside Court or outside it, I for one would not take action as it does not prevent me from functioning, and I would simply ignore the comment, or else say (like Lord Templeman) that everyone is entitled to his opinion. After all, words break no bones.
In Balogh v. Crown Court at St. Albans (1975 QB 373) the defendant told the Judge in Court “You are a humourless automaton. Why don’t you self-destruct?” Lord Denning said that such insults are best treated with disdain, and took no action.
There may, of course, be differences of opinion about what acts prevent, or make it very difficult, for a Judge, to function. For instance, do comments by the public (including lawyers, journalists, etc.), or publicity in the media, about a pending case prevent, or make it very difficult, for the Judge to function? I, for one, am inclined to think that it does not. A Judge should have the equanimity and inner strength to remain unperturbed and unruffled in any situation.
…… A Judge’s shoulders should be broad enough to shrug off such comments or publicity without getting perturbed or influenced.
In my opinion, therefore, the expression ‘preventing or making it extremely difficult, for the Judge to function’ should ordinarily be understood with reference to a Judge who has a true Judge’s temperament — detached, calm, with equanimity, and with broad enough shoulders to shrug off baseless criticism or attempts to influence him without being perturbed.
In my opinion a fresh and modern, democratic approach, like that in England, USA and commonwealth countries, is now required in India to do away with the old anachronistic view. Contempt jurisdiction is now very sparingly exercised in these western countries. Thus in Defence Secretary v. Guardian Newspapers (1985) 1 AC 339 (347) Lord Diplock observed that “the species of contempt which consists of ‘scandalising the judges’ is virtually obsolescent in England and may be ignored”.
Moreover, it must always be remembered that contempt jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction. A Judge is not bound to take action for contempt even if contempt has in fact been committed.
Said article is made as law of the land in a reported judgement in the case of State of Punjab vs Raninder Singh and Another (2008) 1 SCC 564, where it is ruled as under;
“9. …Normally the courts should not be oversensitive and should not take very serious note of any loose expressions in the application. Contempt jurisdiction is to be sparingly exercised in very exceptional cases, as one of us (Markandey Katju, J.) has observed in an article “Contempt of Court: The Need for a Fresh Look” published in the journal section of AIR 2007 (March Part), and we agree with the views expressed therein. However, the applicant should use proper language and state correct facts in his application. Although it is not contempt, proper decorum should be maintained. Be that as it may, we are of the opinion that the learned Judge should not have issued contempt notice in the matters.”
That, the dignity of a judge does not depend upon answering every insult with punishment. The real authority of a court becomes visible when a judge remains calm despite personal provocation.
Lord Denning’s reported response and Justice Viswanathan’s conduct arise from different factual circumstances, but the underlying judicial principle remains similar. Both incidents demonstrate that judicial strength lies not only in possessing coercive power but also in knowing when not to exercise it.
In the present case, the petitioner threw papers rather than a shoe. He also used abusive language and attempted to command the Court by declaring himself sovereign. Justice Viswanathan nevertheless refused to convert the proceeding into a contest between the Judge and the litigant.
The petitioner lost control. The Judge did not.
The spirit of S. Mulgaokar case:
Justice Viswanathan’s response also reflects the principles stated in In Re: S. Mulgaokar, (1978) 3 SCC 339. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer cautioned courts against exercising contempt jurisdiction out of personal indignation. He emphasised restraint and reminded judges that contempt power exists to protect the administration of justice, not the personal sensitivity of judges.
The judgment famously recalls the examples of Christ and Gandhi at critical moments when courts themselves stand on trial before the people. It also recognises that neither the press nor the courts stand above the people.
It observed thus;
“23. […] Christ and Gandhi shall not be lost on the Judges at a critical time when courts are on trial and the people (“We, the People of India”) pronounce the final verdict on all national institutions.
- Poise and peace and inner harmony are so quintessential to the judicial temper that huff, “haywire” or even humiliation shall not besiege; nor, unveracious provocation, frivolous persiflage nor terminological inexactitude throw into palpitating tantrums the balanced cerebration of the judicial mind. The integral yoga of shanti and neeti is so much the cornerstone of the judicial process that criticism, wild or valid, authentic or anathematic, shall have little purchase over the mentation of the Court. I quite realise how hard it is to resist, with sage silence, the shafts of acid speech; and, how alluring it is to succumb to the temptation of argumentation where the thorn, not the rose, triumphs. Truth’s taciturn strategy, the testimony of history says, has a higher power than a hundred thousand tongues or pens. In contempt jurisdiction, silence is a sign of strength since our power is wide and we are prosecutor and judge.
- […] Neither the Press nor the courts are above the People.”
Justice K.V. Viswanathan gave practical expression to this principle. He did not treat the petitioner’s description of him as a “judicial servant” as a personal affront warranting punishment. At the same time, he firmly and correctly questioned the petitioner’s assertion that an individual litigant could command the Supreme Court to act in a particular manner.
Judges such as Lord Denning and Justice K.V. Viswanathan truly reflect the ideal of a people’s judge. Through patience, restraint and constitutional wisdom, they perform the solemn duty of administering justice. Their conduct strengthens public confidence in the judiciary, particularly at a time when judicial authority must rest not merely upon the power to punish, but upon fairness, dignity and moral credibility.
The Supreme Court, in Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court, (1974) 1 SCC 374; Indirect Tax Practitioners’ Assn. v. R.K. Jain, (2010) 8 SCC 281; and Subramanian Swamy v. Arun Shourie, (2014) 12 SCC 344, as also the Allahabad High Court in Rama Surat Singh v. Shiv Kumar Pandey, 1969 SCC OnLine All 226, Rajesh Kumar Singh v. High Court of Judicature of M.P., (2007) 14 SCC 126, has repeatedly cautioned that contempt jurisdiction should not be used to protect corruption, mischief and incompetence of a Judge. It must not become a shield for judicial error, personal sensitivity, arrogance or institutional insecurity. A court cannot command respect merely by invoking the power of contempt. Respect must arise from the quality of justice, the fairness of procedure and the restraint displayed by those who exercise judicial power. An indiscriminate or vindictive use of contempt jurisdiction does not enhance the dignity of the judiciary. It diminishes it in the eyes of the common citizen.
Justice K.V. Viswanathan’s conduct represents the opposite approach. By refusing to react with anger, by distinguishing personal discourtesy from genuine interference with the administration of justice, and by addressing the litigant with firmness tempered by patience, he serves both the cause of justice and the nation. Such conduct restores faith in constitutional courts and reminds citizens that judicial strength lies in restraint, not retaliation.
Under the Constitution, sovereignty belongs collectively to the people. However, that principle does not authorise any individual litigant to assume personal sovereign authority or to issue commands to a constitutional court. Constitutional sovereignty operates through institutions, procedures and the rule of law. No person, however deeply aggrieved, can place himself above that framework.
Compassion did not weaken the Court. It strengthened its authority. Restraint did not diminish judicial dignity. It elevated it.
The decision not to initiate contempt proceedings should not be mistaken for approval of the petitioner’s behaviour. Throwing papers, abusing judges and disrupting proceedings remain serious acts. In an appropriate case, such conduct may justify contempt action or criminal proceedings.
Here, security personnel immediately restored order. The Bench then exercised its judicial discretion and concluded that further punishment was unnecessary because the petitioner appeared deeply disturbed and frustrated.
Justice Viswanathan showed that compassion and authority can coexist. He maintained discipline, examined the case on merits and dismissed the petition according to law.
The India Bar Association therefore endorses his conduct as an example of constitutional restraint and judicial courage.
Lord Denning reportedly responded calmly when a shoe was thrown at him. Justice Viswanathan responded with sympathy when papers and abuse were directed towards his Bench.
In both instances, the judges demonstrated the same enduring truth: the dignity of a court does not depend upon punishing every insult. It rests upon the judge’s ability to remain fair, composed and humane when faced with provocation.