In July: “Huge Evidence”, “More Than Sufficient Material”; In September: “No Evidence”, Case Could Have Been “Shut at the Threshold” — GenZ Lawyers Association Moves Chief Justice
Demands immediate suspension and action under Sections 256, 257 and 198 of the BNS and Sections 2(b), 12 and 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
The complainant’s direct question: “What could be a greater example of corrupt conduct by a judge in passing judicial orders than this?”
Mumbai: Advocate Devkrishna Bhambri, Convenor of the Gen-Z Lawyers Association, has filed a detailed complaint before the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court seeking serious action against Special Judge Chakor S. Baviskar, who granted bail to former police officer and accused Sachin Waze in the Antilia–Mansukh Hiren case.
The complaint alleges that the order dated 29 September 2026 granting bail to Sachin Waze is contrary to binding judgments of the Supreme Court and the Bombay High Court, as well as to findings recorded by the same judge only a short time earlier.
‘More Than Sufficient Material’ on 15 July; What Changed by 29 September?
The most serious ground raised in the complaint concerns the allegedly contradictory findings recorded by the same judge within a span of merely two and a half months.
While rejecting Sachin Waze’s discharge application on 15 July 2026, the judge referred to statements of several witnesses, mobile communications, CDRs, tower locations, CCTV footage, and other electronic and forensic material, and observed that there was “huge evidence” on record.
Most importantly, in paragraph 20 of the same order, the judge stated in clear terms:
“I do not have any hesitation or even a slightest doubt that, more than sufficient material exists on record to frame the charge…”
In other words, the judge had “not even a slightest doubt” about the sufficiency of the material for framing charges; rather, according to him, there was “more than sufficient material” on record.
Thereafter, on 1 August 2026, the same judge framed charges against Sachin Waze.
However, in paragraph 49 of the bail order dated 29 September, the same judge allegedly adopted a completely opposite position, observing that there was no direct evidence against Sachin Waze; that charges had been framed at least to provide the prosecution an opportunity to prove its case; and that otherwise the case could have been “shut at the threshold.”
The complaint states that this observation is directly contrary to the same judge’s categorical findings of “huge evidence” and “more than sufficient material” recorded on 15 July. According to the complaint, the law does not permit a judge to adopt such contradictory positions, and such conduct constitutes an offence under Sections 256 and 257 of the BNS, carrying punishment ranging from three to seven years for the respective offences.
The question raised is serious and direct: What exactly changed within merely two and a half months? On 15 July, the same judge found “huge evidence” and “more than sufficient material” against Sachin Waze and had “not even a slightest doubt” regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. How, then, did the very same case become so weak by 29 September that the judge observed that it could otherwise have been “shut at the threshold”?
The question becomes even more serious because the same judge had already framed charges against Sachin Waze on 1 August. After framing charges, a trial court cannot simply go back on its earlier order and return the accused to the stage of discharge.
This contradiction assumes further significance because the charges had already been framed on 1 August. Once charges are framed, the trial court cannot take the case back to the discharge stage. In Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 2 SCC 179, the Supreme Court made it clear that once a charge has been framed, the trial court has no power to cancel the charge and discharge the accused; the trial must thereafter proceed in accordance with law. The same principle was reiterated in Bharat Parikh v. CBI, (2008) 10 SCC 109.
High Court Had Already Rejected Sachin Waze’s Quashing Petition; Judge Chakor Himself Said in His 15 July 2026 Order—‘This Court Cannot Grant Such Reliefs at All’
The complaint highlights another serious fact. Sachin Waze had earlier approached the Bombay High Court seeking several reliefs, including quashing of the offence and cognizance. The High Court had dismissed that petition.
Recording this very fact in his order dated 15 July, the Special Judge himself observed:
“certainly this Court cannot at all grant those reliefs to him.”
Not only that, the judge also stated that the outcome of Waze’s discharge application could be nothing other than its rejection.
Against this background, the completely contrary approach allegedly adopted by the same judge in the subsequent bail order has been cited in the complaint as a matter requiring serious investigation.
33-Page Bail Order, But Silence on Judgments Cited by NIA? Complaint Raises Serious Question—Why Were Binding Precedents Not Considered?
The complaint raises another serious question over the 33-page order granting bail to Sachin Waze: when the NIA had specifically placed important and binding judgments of the Supreme Court and High Court before the court, where is the consideration of those judgments, their ratio, and their applicability to the present case in the final bail order?
In paragraph 6 of the bail order, the judge himself recorded that both the counsel for the accused and the Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the NIA had relied upon various judgments of the High Court and Supreme Court. The judge further observed:
“I always feel honoured to be happily abided by each and every precedent…”
However, the complaint alleges that despite this categorical statement, the entire 33-page order contains no effective discussion of the ratio of the important and binding judgments cited by the NIA. Nor does the order explain why the precedents relied upon by the prosecution were inapplicable to the present case, on what factual or legal basis they were distinguishable, or why they were not followed.
According to the complaint, this is not merely a case of inadvertently omitting a citation. Where a binding precedent is specifically brought to the notice of a court, it cannot simply be ignored. Judicial discipline requires the court to consider its applicable ratio and, if the precedent is found inapplicable, to record legally sustainable reasons for distinguishing it. In support of this proposition, the complaint relies upon several decisions, including Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar, Yogesh Waman Athavale, Legrand (India) and Garware Polyester.
The complaint places particular emphasis on the Bombay High Court’s decision in Yogesh Waman Athavale v. Vikram Abasaheb Jadhav. In that case, the High Court noted that the impugned order was silent on the authorities cited before it and that it was unclear whether those decisions had even been considered. The High Court further emphasized that merely referring to judgments is not sufficient; a judicial officer is required to understand their ratio and apply judicial mind to whether that ratio governs the case at hand. Directions were ultimately issued for monitoring the concerned judicial officer’s performance.
The complaint also relies upon Baradakant Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court, (1973) 1 SCC 374, where the Supreme Court held that deliberate failure to follow the law laid down by the High Court can create confusion in the administration of justice and undermine the constitutional authority of the superior court. The Supreme Court recognised that deliberate and mala fide disregard of binding law may fall within the principles governing contempt.
Similarly, relying upon New Delhi Municipal Council v. Prominent Hotels Limited, the complaint contends that judicial discipline is one of the fundamental pillars on which the judicial edifice rests and that a “conscious disregard” of binding judgments placed before a court cannot necessarily be treated as a mere inadvertent lapse.
The allegation becomes more serious, according to the complaint, because the issue is not confined merely to silence over the precedents cited by the NIA. The complaint alleges that on the one hand, binding authorities specifically placed before the court by the prosecution were not considered, while on the other, the subsequent bail order adopted reasoning materially inconsistent with the same judge’s own earlier categorical findings concerning the same accused and the same prosecution material. It is this cumulative conduct that the complaint relies upon in seeking scrutiny under the contempt, criminal and disciplinary framework.
The complaint therefore raises a direct question: when the judge himself stated that he considered it an honour to abide by every precedent, where is the answer to the binding judgments placed before him by the NIA in the 33-page final order? If those judgments were inapplicable, where are the reasons for distinguishing them? And if they were applicable, why were they not followed?
‘When the Accused Is a Police Officer, the Standards Applicable to an Ordinary Accused Cannot Be Applied in the Same Manner’—Reliance on Supreme Court Judgments
The complaint states that the Supreme Court has already laid down particularly stringent principles while considering bail for police officers accused of serious offences.
In Prakash Kadam v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta, the Supreme Court made a strong observation in the context of accused police officers:
“Thus, the protectors have become the predators.”
In that case, the order cancelling bail granted to the police officers was upheld.
Similarly, in State of Jharkhand v. Sandeep Kumar, the Supreme Court held that where the accused is himself an investigating officer or police officer and is accused of abusing his official position, considerations applicable to an ordinary accused cannot be applied in the same manner. Even where the officer has been suspended and the chargesheet has been filed, his capacity to influence witnesses and evidence may continue to remain an important consideration.
The complaint also relies upon the 2026 decisions in State of Maharashtra v. Rahul Datta Bhosale and Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P.
Serious Murder Cases Against Waze—Complaint Also Refers to Third CBI FIR
According to the complaint, Sachin Waze is facing prosecution in connection with the murder of Mansukh Hiren and the alleged cover-up, and he also faces charges in the Khwaja Yunus case.
In addition, the complaint states that Waze has also been named in a fresh FIR registered by the CBI on 13 September 2026 concerning allegations relating to multiple murders and cover-ups, including the alleged murder of Disha Salian.
Can a Judge Also Face Contempt Proceedings? Complaint Cites an Earlier Case
The complaint specifically refers to S. Nirki, Principal District Judge, Wardha v. R. A. Khan, Magistrate, Wardha, 1993 Cri LJ 816.
In that case, contempt proceedings were initiated against a judicial officer who granted relief contrary to the orders of superior courts, despite such relief having already been denied by the higher courts.
The principle relied upon is clear—a subordinate court cannot, through another route, render an order of a superior court ineffective. The complaint contends that the same principle applies to the present case.
There are many other judgments where Judges were held guilty of contempt for acting against the binding precedents.
Deliberate passing of judicial orders in conscious disregard of, and directly contrary to, binding precedents constitutes corrupt practice, malice in law, fraud on power, judicial adventurism, breach of judicial oath, and gross judicial misconduct.
The settled principles of law recognise such deliberate defiance of binding law as “the grossest form of judicial dishonesty,” “legal malice,” “fraud on power,” and “fraud on the Constitution,” and as corruption in the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power, even in the absence of separate or additional proof of extraneous consideration, where the judicial order and the manner in which the power has been exercised themselves furnish the material demonstrating such misconduct.
The law further recognises that conduct of this nature may reflect incompetence, incapacity, or proved misbehaviour on the part of the authority concerned and may warrant strict constitutional, disciplinary and, wherever attracted, penal consequences.
These principles stand authoritatively settled by a catena of binding decisions, including Vijay Shekhar v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 666; Shikhar Chemicals v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1653; Shrirang Yadavrao Waghmare v. State, (2019) 9 SCC 144; Muzaffar Husain v. State, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 567; Harish Arora v. Registrar of Coop. Societies, 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 2833; Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2985; S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87; Supdt. of Central Excise v. Somabhai Ranchhodhbhai Patel, (2001) 5 SCC 65; Prominent Hotels v. New Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 11910; Re: M.P. Dwivedi, (1996) 4 SCC 152; Priya Gupta v. Additional Secretary, (2013) 11 SCC 404; State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85; Tata Mohan Rao v. S. Venkateswarlu, 2025 INSC 678; R.R. Parekh v. High Court of Gujarat, (2016) 14 SCC 1; Medical Council of India v. G.C.R.G. Memorial Trust, (2018) 12 SCC 564; Harish Arora v. Deputy Registrar, 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 2853; and Kamisetty Pedda Venkata Subbamma v. Chinna Kummagandla Venkataiah, 2004 SCC OnLine AP 1009.
Can No Action Be Taken Merely Because He Is a Judge? The Janardhan Reddy ‘Cash-for-Bail’ Case Provides an Answer
An important aspect of the complaint for the common citizen is that holding judicial office does not, by itself, provide absolute immunity from criminal or departmental investigation. At the same time, merely because a judicial order is erroneous does not automatically establish corruption; the essential ingredients prescribed by law and the supporting evidence must be examined.
In this context, the complaint cites the 2012 Gali Janardhan Reddy ‘cash-for-bail’ case.
The then CBI Special Judge T. Pattabhi Rama Rao had granted bail to Janardhan Reddy. After allegations emerged of an illegal financial transaction in consideration for the bail order, the concerned judge was suspended, arrested by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, and subjected to departmental proceedings, as recorded in the complaint.
There are many cases where Judges were arrested, charge sheeted and tried and punished.
Is It Always Necessary to ‘Catch Someone Taking Money’ to Establish Corrupt Intent?
The complaint also relies upon R.R. Parekh v. High Court of Gujarat, (2016) 14 SCC 1.
On that basis, the complaint argues that in cases of judicial misconduct, direct proof of a corrupt motive—such as evidence of an actual exchange of money—is not invariably necessary. In an appropriate case, an inference may be drawn from the surrounding circumstances, judicial conduct, and deliberate deviation from the law or prescribed procedure.
At the same time, the complaint acknowledges an important legal limitation: a merely erroneous or bona fide judicial order does not, by itself, establish corruption.
Section 257 of the BNS—What Does the Law Provide for a Judge or Public Servant Acting Judicially?
The complaint also relies upon Section 257 of the BNS. According to the provision quoted in the complaint, where a public servant, in a judicial proceeding, corruptly or maliciously makes or pronounces any order, report, verdict or decision which he knows to be contrary to law, the offence may be punishable with imprisonment extending up to seven years.
Demand Before the Chief Justice—Call for the Record, Order an Inquiry, and Take Strict Action if the Charges Are Established
The complaint requests the Chief Justice to examine the bail order dated 29 September along with the complete judicial record connected with it; call for the written submissions and judgments relied upon by the NIA; and examine together the 15 July discharge order, the 1 August charge-framing order, and the 29 September bail order.
What happened to the binding judgments cited by the NIA? What happened to the reliefs that had already been rejected by the High Court? What happened to the stricter standards laid down by the Supreme Court when the accused himself is a police officer? And, most importantly, how could the same judge arrive at two completely opposite conclusions on the same record?
The complaint seeking answers to these questions has now reached the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court. The issue, it states, is no longer confined to the grant of bail to a single accused; it also raises questions concerning judicial discipline, accountability, and the ordinary citizen’s faith in the administration of justice.
