Union Government Seeks Four Weeks’ Time from the Bombay High Court to Decide Complaints Seeking Registration of FIR Against Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Senior Advocate Rebecca John; Assures the Court that a Decision Will Be Taken Within the Stipulated Period.
The Union Government informed the Bombay High Court that where no decision is taken on a complaint within 120 days, the provision of “Deemed Sanction” under Section 218 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) becomes applicable. Rashid Khan Pathan contends that the statutory period of 120 days in respect of all his complaints expired long ago. Consequently, according to him, prosecution sanction from the Office of the President must, in law, be deemed to have been granted, thereby conferring upon him the legal right to institute criminal proceedings directly before the competent court against Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and others. [Writ Petition No. WP/4443/2024 (Rashid Khan Pathan v. Shri Niraj Kumar Gayagi & Ors.)]
Several advocates, including Advocate Nilesh Ojha, Chairman of the Indian Bar Association, appeared before the Court on behalf of Rashid Khan Pathan. The principal legal submissions on behalf of the petitioner were advanced by Advocate Nilesh Ojha.
Historic Success in the Fight Against Judicial Corruption
Describing the development as a major breakthrough after four years of persistent legal struggle, various lawyers’ organisations and human rights organisations felicitated and honoured Rashid Khan Pathan, describing the development as a “milestone” in the movement for judicial reforms.
The other allegations include claims that Justice Chandrachud misused judicial power to benefit COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers and, in the process, violated the fundamental rights of citizens, including pregnant women. According to the petitioner, these allegations have also been the subject of an extensive public campaign conducted by Awaken India Movement.
Mumbai, 17 July: During the hearing of Writ Petition No. WP/4443/2024 (Rashid Khan Pathan v. Shri Niraj Kumar Gayagi & Ors.) pending before the Bombay High Court, an important development took place today. The Union Government sought an additional four weeks from the Court to take a final decision on three complaints relating to prosecution sanction and registration of an FIR against former Chief Justice of India Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud.
During the hearing, the Union Government acknowledged before the Bombay High Court that under Section 218 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), where the competent authority fails to decide the question of prosecution sanction within 120 days, the statutory doctrine of “Deemed Sanction” comes into operation.
According to the petitioner, Rashid Khan Pathan, the complaints were submitted before the competent authorities as early as 2020. He states that despite furnishing extensive supporting documents, court records and other evidence, the concerned Central Government authorities have allegedly delayed taking any decision for several years.
The petitioner further submits that once the Union Government itself has acknowledged before the Bombay High Court that the doctrine of Deemed Sanction applies where no decision is taken within the statutory period prescribed under Section 218 of the BNSS, the same legal consequence necessarily follows in his own case. According to him, prosecution sanction must therefore be deemed to have been granted, entitling him to institute a complaint case directly before the competent criminal court.
The petitioner also submits that this legal position has been recorded by the Bombay High Court in its order dated 1 May 2026. According to him, since the statutory period of 120 days in respect of all his complaints expired several years ago, prosecution sanction from the Office of the President must now be treated as having been deemed to have been granted, thereby conferring upon him the legal right to initiate criminal proceedings before the competent court against Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud.
The petitioners further contend that an identical legal position has also arisen in relation to a complaint concerning Justice Riyaz I. Chagla of the Bombay High Court. According to them, Mr. Ambar Koiri and Mr. Yohan Tengra of Awaken India Movement submitted a complaint before the President of India along with supporting documents alleging that Justice Chagla heard and decided a matter concerning the Serum Institute despite circumstances which, according to the complainants, required prior disclosure.
The petitioners further submit that during the judicial proceedings it was allegedly acknowledged on behalf of the Serum Institute that there existed a relationship between the Institute and Justice Chagla. According to the petitioners, if that were so, failure to disclose such facts before hearing the matter raises a serious legal issue concerning alleged judicial misconduct in the light of the principles governing recusal and disclosure laid down by the Supreme Court.
It is on the basis of these allegations that the petitioners approached the President of India. According to them, no decision was taken on that complaint within the statutory period of 120 days prescribed under Section 218 of the BNSS. Consequently, they contend that the doctrine of Deemed Sanction has become applicable in that matter as well, thereby entitling them to initiate further proceedings before the competent court in accordance with law.
Complaints Pending Since 2022
The petitioner submits that all three complaints have remained pending before various Central Government authorities for nearly six years without any final decision. According to him, such prolonged inaction not only defeats the statutory mandate but has also adversely affected the course of justice. He contends that where the legislature has prescribed a time limit of 120 days, allowing complaints to remain pending for years defeats the legislative intent.
Thirteen Distinct Allegations Against Former CJI Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud
The petition refers to thirteen separate alleged acts of misconduct and criminal offences concerning former Chief Justice of India Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud. According to the petitioner, these allegations arise from various judicial orders, alleged procedural irregularities, alleged disregard of binding Supreme Court precedents, alleged violations of the principles of natural justice, and alleged misuse of judicial powers.
Principal Allegation: Passing Orders Without Hearing the Parties
According to the petitioner, Allegation No. 9 concerns the alleged violation of the principles of judicial impartiality and the Code of Conduct applicable to judges. The petitioner contends that despite the principles governing recusal and conflict of interest laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770, Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 808, and other decisions, Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud allegedly continued to hear matters arising out of the same underlying transaction, including those relating to FIR No. 806/2019 and FIR No. 243/2021, even after his son, Dr. Abhinav Chandrachud, had appeared as counsel in connection with the same dispute.
According to the petitioner, the order of the Bombay High Court dated 20 September 2021 demonstrates that Dr. Abhinav Chandrachud had appeared as an advocate in proceedings arising out of the said dispute. Despite this, Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud subsequently passed orders dated 29 November 2021, 9 September 2022, and 10 October 2022 in SLP (Cri.) No. 9131 of 2021, SLP (Cri.) No. 9092 of 2022, and other matters arising out of the same dispute and the same underlying transaction.
The petitioner further claims that, at the relevant time, the alleged conflict of interest had become the subject of widespread discussion within the legal fraternity and among the general public, and that a complaint regarding the issue had already been submitted to the President of India on 5 October 2022. Nevertheless, according to the petitioner, the continuation of the hearing in those matters constituted a violation of the established principles of judicial ethics, impartiality, and recusal, and amounted to an alleged fraud on power.
The petitioner further alleges that the most startling aspect of the matter is that the concerned Special Leave Petition was allegedly heard ex parte on the very first day, and that orders were passed without hearing the State Government or the Public Prosecutor and without issuing notice to the respondents. The petitioner further contends that the order directed the High Court to decide an application within a time-bound period even though, according to the petitioner, no such application was pending before the High Court at that time. The petitioner also states that Senior Advocate Rebecca John appeared on behalf of the petitioner in those proceedings. The petitioner alleges that this demonstrates her involvement in the alleged conspiracy.
According to the petitioner, the manner in which the order was passed raises serious legal questions concerning compliance with the principles of natural justice and the fairness of the judicial process. On that basis, the petitioner alleges that the impugned order constitutes an instance of the alleged misuse of judicial power (fraud on power) and has sought an independent investigation into the matter.
According to the petitioner, the most significant allegation is that the impugned order was allegedly passed in violation of the principle of Audi Alteram Partem (the right of the other side to be heard), as recognised in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, by passing the order without affording the State and other necessary parties an opportunity of hearing.
The petition further alleges that, contrary to the principles laid down in ABCD v. Union of India, (2020) 2 SCC 52, and Pushpa Devi M. Jatia v. M.L. Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 367, reliance was allegedly placed upon facts and documents that did not form part of the original judicial record. According to the petitioner, no legal action has been taken in relation to those alleged irregularities.
Demand for an Independent Investigation
The petitioner alleges that the matter concerns the alleged misuse of judicial power and an alleged multi-crore extortion scheme. At this stage, however, no court has reached any conclusion regarding the truth or falsity of these allegations, and they can be established or disproved only through a competent investigation conducted in accordance with law.
On this basis, the petitioner has sought an independent investigation under the provisions corresponding to Sections 340 and 344 of the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure (and their corresponding provisions under the present legal framework). In support of this request, reliance has been placed upon, inter alia, Gobind Mehta v. State, AIR 1971 SC 1708; State of Maharashtra v. Kamlakar Nandram Bhawsar; and K. Ram Reddy v. State of A.P.
What Happens Next?
Following the Union Government’s request for an additional four weeks to decide the complaints, the matter has raised an important legal issue. On the one hand, the Union Government has sought further time to decide the question of prosecution sanction. On the other hand, the petitioner contends that the statutory period of 120 days prescribed under Section 218 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) expired long ago and that, consequently, the doctrine of Deemed Sanction has already come into operation in his case.
Accordingly, the petitioner claims that he is now legally entitled to initiate criminal proceedings directly before the competent court without awaiting any further decision on prosecution sanction.
The forthcoming proceedings before the Bombay High Court, the Union Government’s final decision on the pending complaints, and the legal questions concerning prosecution sanction are therefore expected to be closely watched.
