The judgment in Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram & Anr. v. Sou. Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar & Anr., 2026 INSC 724, to the extent it observes that proceedings for perjury should normally be postponed until the conclusion of the substantive proceedings, is plainly per incuriam.
The judgment appears to have misinterpreted the Constitution Bench decision in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, by treating an incidental observation (obiter dicta) as the governing principle while overlooking the binding ratio decidendi expressly adopted therein from the Constitution Bench judgment in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397. Consequently, the Bench observed that proceedings for perjury should normally be initiated only after the conclusion of the substantive proceedings, whereas the binding Constitution Bench law lays down no such general proposition.
Significantly, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Confederation of Real Estate Developers’ Associations of India v. Vanashakti, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2474, recently set aside a judgment rendered by a two-Judge Bench comprising Hon’ble Justice Ujjal Bhuyan on the ground that it was contrary to an earlier binding judgment of a coordinate Bench. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the well-settled principle that a judgment rendered in disregard of an earlier binding precedent of a coordinate or larger Bench is per incuriam and consequently loses its efficacy as a binding precedent.
The law is equally well settled that no Bench can ignore or take a view contrary to a binding decision of a larger Bench or a Bench of co-equal strength. In the event of disagreement, judicial discipline mandates that the matter be referred to a larger Bench. A subsequent Bench, even if it notices or discusses the earlier judgments, cannot lawfully take a contrary view on the same question of law. Any such judgment is per incuriam and does not constitute a binding precedent. Only a Bench of larger strength is competent to depart from or overrule the earlier binding law.
The judgment is undoubtedly correct to the limited extent that it distinguishes between a merely incorrect statement and a deliberately false statement. An inadvertent error, typographical mistake, clerical omission or bona fide discrepancy, by itself, cannot constitute the offence of perjury. Prosecution for perjury necessarily requires a conscious, deliberate and material falsehood intended to mislead the Court or obstruct the due administration of justice.
However, paragraph 17 travels far beyond this unexceptionable proposition. It erroneously attributes to the Constitution Bench judgment in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370, a proposition that proceedings under Section 340 CrPC should normally be deferred until the conclusion of the substantive proceedings. No such principle was laid down by the Constitution Bench.
On the contrary, the observation is directly contrary to the binding ratio of the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397, which was expressly quoted with approval and adopted in paragraph 32 of Iqbal Singh Marwah. The Constitution Bench unequivocally held that, as a general rule, criminal proceedings should be accorded precedence over civil proceedings, subject only to exceptional circumstances. The proposition stated in paragraph 17, therefore, reverses the very principle laid down by the Constitution Bench and cannot constitute the law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution.
Furthermore, the proposition is inherently self-contradictory. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a litigant whose case is founded upon falsehood, suppression of material facts or fabricated evidence has no right to be heard on merits and may be non-suited at any stage of the proceedings. It would therefore be wholly illogical and legally inconsistent to hold, on the one hand, that such a litigant is disentitled to any relief on merits and, on the other hand, that the Court should ordinarily postpone the inquiry into that very falsehood until after hearing and finally deciding the case on merits. Such an approach would permit a litigant to prosecute and possibly succeed in proceedings founded upon fraud before the Court even determines whether the foundation of the litigation itself is false. This is precisely what the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff sought to avoid by holding that criminal proceedings should ordinarily receive precedence in the larger public interest.
The Impugned Observation
In paragraph 17 of Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram, the Bench observed:
“Before parting, it may be noted that the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another was of the view that a direction for filing of a complaint normally ought not to be made during the pendency of the substantive proceedings before the Court but only when the proceedings conclude and the final judgment is rendered. The object is clear inasmuch as the main proceedings ought to be proceeded with and decided instead of diverting them with the aid of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C.”
With respect, this is not the binding ratio of Iqbal Singh Marwah. More importantly, it is directly opposed to the Constitution Bench ratio in M.S. Sheriff, which Iqbal Singh Marwah expressly quoted with approval.
The error is fundamental. The Bench has treated an incidental or contextual observation as though it were the governing ratio, while overlooking the binding principle actually adopted by the Constitution Bench.
Only the Constitution Bench Ratio in M.S. Sheriff Governs the Issue
The governing and binding law is the ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, namely that, as between civil and criminal proceedings, criminal proceedings should ordinarily be given precedence.
The Constitution Bench declared:
“As between the civil and the criminal proceedings, we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence.”
It further explained why criminal prosecution cannot ordinarily be made to await the conclusion of civil proceedings:
“The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial.”
The Constitution Bench also warned that criminal action should not be delayed until memories have faded and evidence has become unreliable:
“Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust.”
The Court ultimately directed that the civil suits remain stayed until the criminal proceedings were concluded.
Thus, the Constitution Bench did not hold that criminal proceedings should await the civil case. It held precisely the opposite: criminal proceedings ordinarily deserve precedence, although special facts in a particular case may justify a different course.
That is the binding ratio. No Bench of lesser or co-equal strength could dilute, reverse or neutralise it.
Iqbal Singh Marwah Expressly Adopts M.S. Sheriff
Paragraph 32 of Iqbal Singh Marwah does not displace M.S. Sheriff. It expressly relies upon it and describes its observations as providing a “complete answer” to the issue before the Court.
The Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah first explained that civil and criminal proceedings are governed by different standards of proof. A civil case is decided on a preponderance of probabilities, whereas a criminal prosecution must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
It then expressly reproduced the relevant paragraphs of M.S. Sheriff, including the declaration that criminal matters should be given precedence and that the civil suits in that case should remain stayed until the criminal proceedings were completed.
Therefore, the legally binding proposition emerging from the Constitution Bench authorities is unmistakable:
- there is no statutory or legal rule requiring criminal prosecution to await the final decision in a civil proceeding;
- findings in civil and criminal proceedings are not ordinarily binding upon each other;
- criminal proceedings should generally receive precedence because public interest demands swift criminal justice; and
- the Court retains discretion to adopt a different course only where special circumstances make it expedient and just.
Paragraph 17 of Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram reverses this position by converting an exceptional possibility of deferment into a supposed normal rule of postponement.
An Obiter Observation Cannot Override a Binding Constitution Bench Ratio
A decision is binding for what it actually decides and not for every observation appearing in it. The binding element is the ratio decidendi—the proposition of law necessary for deciding the issue before the Court.
An incidental caution that Section 340 CrPC should not be misused to delay a proceeding cannot be converted into a universal or normal rule that perjury proceedings must await final adjudication.
The distinction is decisive.
Courts undoubtedly possess the power to reject a frivolous Section 340 application filed merely to delay the substantive case. But that procedural power cannot be transformed into immunity for a litigant whose case is founded upon a deliberately false affidavit, forged document or fabricated record.
The existence of some abusive applications cannot justify postponing every genuine complaint of perjury.
By treating a caution against procedural abuse as the governing rule and overlooking the contrary binding Constitution Bench ratio, paragraph 17 of Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram falls squarely within the doctrine of per incuriam.
Why the Judgment Is Per Incuriam
A judgment is rendered per incuriam when it is delivered in ignorance of, or contrary to, a binding statutory provision or an earlier binding precedent.
Paragraph 17 of Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram is per incuriam for the following reasons:
First, it is contrary to the Constitution Bench ratio in M.S. Sheriff, which gives ordinary precedence to criminal proceedings.
Second, it misreads Iqbal Singh Marwah, which expressly adopts and reproduces the ratio of M.S. Sheriff.
Third, it treats an incidental observation as binding while disregarding the governing ratio of the Constitution Bench.
Fourth, it overlooks the settled principle that a litigant whose case is founded upon falsehood has no right to insist upon adjudication on merits.
Fifth, it disregards decisions in which courts have required Section 340 proceedings or inquiries into false evidence to be decided before the main matter.
Sixth, it creates a proposition that enables a dishonest litigant to continue obtaining advantage from false evidence until the entire substantive proceeding is completed.
A two-Judge Bench could not lawfully take a view contrary to the Constitution Bench. If the Bench considered that the law in M.S. Sheriff required reconsideration, the only permissible course was to request reference to a larger Bench. It could not dilute the binding Constitution Bench ratio through a contrary observation.
Judicial Discipline and the Earlier Vanashakti Reversal
The conclusion assumes greater importance in light of the recent three-Judge Bench decision in Confederation of Real Estate Developers’ Associations of India v. Vanashakti, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2474.
In that case, the three-Judge Bench set aside a judgment authored by a two-Judge Bench headed by Justice Ujjal Bhuyan because the judgment was contrary to an earlier binding decision of a coordinate Bench.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a Bench of co-equal strength cannot disregard or overrule an earlier coordinate Bench judgment. A contrary view can be taken only by a larger Bench.
The same rule applies with still greater force when a two-Judge Bench departs from a Constitution Bench judgment. A Constitution Bench precedent cannot be neutralised by selective reading, reinterpretation of an obiter observation or omission to apply its binding ratio.
Accordingly, paragraph 17 of Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram has no binding precedential force insofar as it suggests that perjury proceedings should normally await the conclusion of the substantive case.
Fraud Must Be Examined Before a Case Founded Upon Fraud Is Decided
The administration of justice cannot proceed on the assumption that a Court must first decide a case on the basis of disputed or allegedly fabricated material and examine the fabrication only after judgment.
Where the falsehood goes to the root of the proceeding, the issue of perjury is not collateral. It determines whether the substantive case deserves to be heard at all.
A litigant cannot be permitted to say:
- first decide my case on the basis of the document I have produced;
- postpone examination of whether the document is forged;
- permit me to obtain interim and final advantages during the pendency of the proceeding; and
- consider prosecution only after I have exhausted the judicial process.
Such an approach rewards deception, prolongs fraudulent litigation and exposes the Court itself to the risk of passing orders on fabricated material.
The principle that fraud vitiates all judicial acts becomes meaningless if the inquiry into fraud is compulsorily postponed until after the proceeding founded upon that fraud has concluded.
Haresh V. Milani States the Correct Law
The Bombay High Court in Union of India v. Haresh V. Milani, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2080, correctly recognised that an application under Section 340 CrPC may have to be decided before the substantive proceeding.
The Court noticed the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Syed Nazim Husain v. Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, directing the trial court to decide the Section 340 application before proceeding further.
It also relied upon:
- Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 114;
- Rameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011) 8 SCC 249; and
- Kishore Samrite v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2013) 2 SCC 398.
These judgments affirm that a person whose case is based upon falsehood has no right to approach the Court, is not entitled to be heard on merits and may be thrown out at any stage.
The reasoning in Haresh V. Milani correctly applies the Constitution Bench principle. Where the allegation of fabrication directly affects the foundation of the main case, the Court must first determine the Section 340 application instead of allowing the alleged falsehood to govern the substantive adjudication.
Gulab Chaturkar Correctly Applies the Binding Ratio
The Bombay High Court in Gulab Chaturkar v. Vimalabai, 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 11964, also states the correct proposition of law.
The allegation in that case concerned tampering with a document produced in evidence. The Court correctly held that the decision on the Section 340 application would have a material bearing on the merits of the suit because the allegedly tampered document formed part of the evidence to be evaluated.
The Court therefore held that the application under Sections 195 and 340 CrPC had to be decided prior to the civil suit.
This is the only logical and legally sustainable course. A Court cannot properly evaluate the evidentiary value of a disputed document while refusing to decide whether that document was tampered with.
The ruling in Gulab Chaturkar is consistent with:
- the ratio in S. Sheriff;
- paragraph 32 of Iqbal Singh Marwah;
- the principle that fraud vitiates judicial proceedings; and
- the duty of courts to protect the purity of their own processes.
It is paragraph 17 of Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram, and not Gulab Chaturkar, that departs from binding law.
Praveen R. v. Arpitha Also States the Correct Position
The Karnataka High Court in Praveen R. v. Arpitha, 2021 SCC OnLine Kar 15703, correctly rejected the contention that proceedings concerning perjury should be deferred because another investigation was pending.
The Court described perjury as a heinous offence in all civilised societies and held that consideration of complaints concerning perjury cannot be deferred or delayed, failing which the “fountain of justice” may be polluted.
This reasoning is entirely consistent with M.S. Sheriff. Delay benefits the wrongdoer. Evidence becomes stale, memories fade and the false material continues to influence the judicial proceeding.
The Court is not merely deciding a private dispute when it deals with perjury. It is protecting the administration of justice itself.
The ratio in Praveen R. is therefore the correct proposition of law and deserves to be followed.
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan University Conclusively Disproves the Theory of Mandatory Deferment
The three-Judge Bench judgment in Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan University v. Union of India, (2019) 14 SCC 761, conclusively demonstrates that an inquiry into fraud and false evidence may and must precede final adjudication where the alleged falsehood goes to the root of the case.
The institution had relied upon photographs, case sheets and records to claim compliance with statutory requirements. When the genuineness of those materials was disputed, the Supreme Court did not postpone the issue until disposal of the writ petition.
Instead, it constituted an expert committee headed by a senior officer deputed by the CBI and assisted by doctors from AIIMS. The Court specifically warned that prosecution under Section 193 IPC could follow if the allegations were established.
After receiving the inquiry report, the Court found that manipulated records had been produced to mislead it and obtain a favourable order. The Court expressly recorded that, had the inquiry not been ordered, the fraud would not have come to light.
It then directed prosecution under Section 193 IPC, imposed a penalty of ₹5 crore and passed further consequential directions.
The course adopted by the three-Judge Bench is irreconcilable with the proposition stated in paragraph 17 of Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram. It demonstrates that the Court must first expose and determine fraud where the disputed material forms the foundation of the substantive claim.
A Person Whose Case Is Based on Falsehood Cannot Be Heard on Merits
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a litigant whose case is based upon falsehood has no right to approach the Court and may be thrown out at any stage.
Furthermore, several binding decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which mandate prompt and effective action against deliberate falsehood, suppression of material facts, fabricated evidence and mutually destructive versions, appear not to have been noticed. These include Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan University & Anr. v. Union of India, (2019) 14 SCC 761, Kishore Samrite v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2013) 2 SCC 398, and Sundar v. State, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 310.
These authorities unequivocally establish that where a litigant approaches the Court on the basis of deliberate falsehood, material suppression, fabricated documents or irreconcilably contradictory pleadings, the Court is duty-bound to examine the matter without avoidable delay, deny discretionary relief to such litigant and, wherever the statutory requirements are satisfied, initiate prosecution for perjury and other allied offences affecting the administration of justice.
A litigant whose case is founded upon falsehood has no right to insist upon adjudication on merits. Permitting such a litigant to continue the proceedings without first addressing the fraud would amount to allowing the judicial process itself to be used as an instrument of deception.
The power to initiate proceedings for perjury is therefore not merely punitive or discretionary in the ordinary sense. It carries with it a corresponding judicial duty to preserve the purity, credibility and integrity of court proceedings. Where a clear and material case of deliberate falsehood is brought to the notice of the Court, failure to conduct the requisite inquiry or to take appropriate action may amount to a failure to discharge that judicial duty and may embolden dishonest litigants to pollute the stream of justice with impunity.
It would be self-contradictory to hold, on one hand, that a person whose case is founded upon falsehood is not entitled to be heard on merits and, on the other hand, that the Court should normally postpone the inquiry into the falsehood until after hearing and finally deciding that very case on merits.
The falsehood must first be examined wherever it is material to the entitlement of the litigant to continue the proceeding.
Otherwise, the dishonest litigant is effectively granted the very hearing on merits that the binding precedents prohibit.
The Distinction Between Innocent Mistake and Deliberate Falsehood Remains Protected
Declaring paragraph 17 per incuriam does not mean that every error must result in prosecution.
The Court must first determine whether the statement is:
- materially false;
- consciously made;
- relevant to the adjudication;
- supported or contradicted by objective records;
- intended to mislead the Court; and
- sufficiently serious to justify action in the interests of justice.
An innocent typographical mistake is not perjury. Nor is every factual discrepancy necessarily criminal.
But once the Court finds a prima facie case of deliberate falsehood, fabrication or contradictory sworn versions on a material issue, it cannot postpone its duty merely because the main case is pending.
The distinction protects the innocent without granting immunity to the dishonest.
Correct Proposition of Law
The correct and binding legal position is:
- The Constitution Bench ratio in S. Sheriff v. State of Madras governs the issue.
- As between civil and criminal proceedings, criminal proceedings should ordinarily receive precedence.
- Paragraph 32 of Iqbal Singh Marwah expressly adopts and reproduces that ratio; it does not lay down a contrary rule of routine deferment.
- No lower or co-equal Bench can convert an incidental observation into a proposition contrary to the Constitution Bench ratio.
- A frivolous or dilatory Section 340 application may be rejected at the threshold.
- However, where deliberate falsehood, fabricated evidence or tampered documents go to the root of the substantive proceeding, the Section 340 application or appropriate inquiry must ordinarily be decided first.
- A litigant whose case is based upon falsehood has no right to insist upon adjudication on merits.
- The decisions in Union of India v. Haresh V. Milani, Gulab Chaturkar v. Vimalabai and Praveen R. v. Arpitha correctly apply the binding Constitution Bench law.
- The three-Judge Bench decision in Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan University confirms that inquiry and prosecution for fraud may precede final disposal of the substantive proceeding.
- Paragraph 17 of Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram, insofar as it states that perjury proceedings should normally await the conclusion of the main matter, is contrary to binding precedent and is therefore per incuriam.
Conclusion
The judgment in Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram is correct only insofar as it protects litigants from prosecution for innocent, inadvertent or typographical mistakes.
Its observation that proceedings under Section 340 CrPC should normally await the conclusion of the substantive proceedings is legally unsustainable. It misreads Iqbal Singh Marwah, overlooks the binding Constitution Bench ratio in M.S. Sheriff, and conflicts with subsequent decisions requiring prompt action where falsehood affects the foundation of the case.
The governing law is not that perjury must wait for the main proceeding. The binding rule is that criminal proceedings ordinarily deserve precedence, subject only to special circumstances justifying a different course.
The decisions in Haresh V. Milani, Gulab Chaturkar and Praveen R. correctly state and apply this proposition. They recognise that a Court cannot decide a case on allegedly fabricated evidence while postponing examination of the fabrication until after final judgment.
Paragraph 17 of Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram therefore does not constitute a binding precedent. Being contrary to the law declared by the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff, as expressly adopted in Iqbal Singh Marwah, it is per incuriam and loses its efficacy as a precedent.
Judicial discipline requires that the binding Constitution Bench ratio alone be followed. Any departure from that ratio could be made only by a larger Bench—not by a two-Judge Bench through an incidental concluding observation.
The purity of judicial proceedings cannot be preserved by postponing action against deliberate falsehood. Innocent mistakes must be protected, but fraud, fabrication and perjury must be examined at the earliest stage at which they affect the administration of justice.
Relevant paras of the binding precedents:-
Constitution Bench decision in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370. ruled thus;
“32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. While examining a similar contention in an appeal against an order directing filing of a complaint under Section 476 of the old Code, the following observations made by a Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras [1954 SCR 1144 : AIR 1954 SC 397 : 1954 Cri LJ 1019] give a complete answer to the problem posed: (AIR p. 399, paras 15-16)
“15. As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment.
- Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust.
This, however, is not a hard-and-fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under Section 476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished.”
In Union of India v. Haresh V. Milani, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2080, it is ruled as under;
“4. Learned counsel for respondent has, in support of his submission relied upon the judgment of Allahabad High Court, in the case of Syed Nazim Husain v. The Additional Principal Judge Family Court in Writ Petition No.(M/S) of 2002, wherein also similar point was raised as to whether the application under Section 340 CrPC, has to be decided first before adjudicating the proceeding in which the said application was filed. By it’s order, Allahabad High Court has directed the trial Court to dispose of the application moved by petitioner under Section 340 CrPC, before proceeding further in accordance with law.
- Learned counsel for respondent has then relied upon the judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court, in the cases of i] Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2010) 2 SCC 114], ii] Rameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi [(2011) 8 SCC 249, and iii] Kishore Samrite v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2013) 2 SCC 398], holding that, “It is very well settled that a person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the Court and he is not entitled to be heard on merits and he can be thrown out at any stage of the litigation.
Therefore it would be just and proper to hear C.A. No. 2939 of 2017 filed by respondent under Section 340 Cr.P.C. before deciding the Writ Petition.”
The proper appreciation of law is in the case of Gulab Chaturkar v. Vimalabai, 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 11964, it is ruled as under;
“2. The petition challenges the order dated 12-08-2022 passed by the trial court below exh 1 proceeding the matter without arguments of the plaintiffs. It is contended that since an application under S. 340 of the CrPC has been filed in MJC No. 660/22 the same needs to be decided first before the final decision of the suit. Reliance is placed upon the decision of Harish Malani V Haresh Malani in Civil Application No. 2939/2017 in WP No. 14038/17 decided on 26-04-2018 wherein it has been held that in case an application under Section 340 of Cr. P.C. is filed it has to be heard and decided first before deciding the WP. Similar is the proposition is laid down in WP No. (M/s) of 2002 decided 09-01-2003 Syed Nasim Hussain v. Additional Principal Judge Family Court.
- The basic nature of allegation under section 340 of the Cr. P.C., is that it prescribes the procedure for cases mentioned in Section 195 Cr. P.C. Section 195 CrPC contemplates prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servant, for offences against public justice and for offence relating to documents given in evidence. In such cases, if the Court comes to a conclusion that a document given in evidence has been tampered with as is the allegation in MJC No. 660/22 then any decision on such a plea would have a material bearing upon the decision of the suit on merits as the said decision, shall have to be considered by the court while evaluating the evidence led in the suit. This indicates that decision of application under Section 195 r/w 340 shall have to be prior in point of time before the suit is decided on its merits. Mr. Parmar, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that MJC No. 660/22, is lying in the same court where RCS No. 1468/2001 is pending. Considering which it would be necessary, for the learned trial court to decide MJC No. 660/22 prior to deciding the RCS N0.1468/01.”
In Praveen R. v. Arpitha, 2021 SCC OnLine Kar 15703, it is ruled as under;
“7. The inner voice of this decision appears to have fallen on the deaf ears of the learned Judge of the court below
- c) The vehement contention of Mr. Jhadhav, learned Sr. Adv. that a Police investigation is launched against the petitioner-husband for producing copies of IT Returns and other documents of the respondent and therefore, till after its completion, no action for the commission of alleged perjury can be initiated, is bit difficult to countenance, more particularly, when the authenticity of these documents is not disputed even before this Court; in fact the Court below too has recorded a specific finding to this effect; the said Police investigation has nothing to do with perjury allegedly committed by the respondent; act of perjury is treated as a heinous offence in all civilized societies; consideration of complaints with regard to the same cannot be deferred or delayed; otherwise there is all possibility of the fountain of justice being polluted.”
Three Judge Bench in Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan University v. Union of India, (2019) 14 SCC 761, first called enquiry report and then decided main proceeding on the basis of result of that enquiry.
It is ruled as under;
“6.1. By referring to the Assessment Report pursuant to the inspection done on 25-9-2017 and 26-9-2017, learned Senior Counsel for Respondents 1 and 2 submitted that the College was indulging in fraud by showing persons who were not sick as patients only for the purpose of showing compliance of the minimum requirements. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the College refuted the said contention and argued that all the patients were genuine. As this Court was in no position to determine the truth or otherwise of the allegations, an enquiry was directed to be conducted into the correctness of the statistics, reports and material placed before this Court by the College along with the writ petition.
6.2. For the said purpose, a committee was constituted [Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan University v. Union of India, (2019) 14 SCC 779] by this Court. A senior officer deputed by the Director, Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), was directed to head the Committee which would have two doctors of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (Aiims) as its members. It is relevant to note that in the said order dated 14-12-2017 [Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan University v. Union of India, (2019) 14 SCC 779] it was made clear that the College may have to face prosecution under Section 193 of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) if the allegations made by Respondent 2 were found to be correct. The decision to constitute a committee by this Court was arrived at after a thorough examination of the voluminous material placed on record by the College. The material was constituted of several photographs showing patients occupying the beds and their case sheets. A bare perusal of the photographs did not convince us that the patients were genuine. After a close scrutiny of the case sheets, we had serious doubts about the necessity for admission of persons suffering from minor ailments as in-patients.
- Without delving deep into the details of the report submitted by the Committee, it is clear that the College is guilty of practising fraud on this Court. The conduct of the College administration in indulging in manipulations and hoodwinking the authorities to project compliance with the requisite minimum standards for admission of students does not deserve to be condoned. The impunity with which the College has manufactured records to convince us that they were being unnecessarily hounded by MCI in spite of their compliance with the required standards is deprecated. The brazen attempt by the College in taking this Court for a ride by placing on record manoeuvred documents to obtain a favourable order is a clear-cut act of deceit. The justification given by the College regarding the absence of certain residents has turned out to be a concocted story. Had we not initiated an enquiry by the Committee of Experts, the fraud played by the College on this Court would not have come to light. It is trite that every litigant has to approach the Court with clean hands. A litigant who indulges in suppression of facts and misrepresentation is not entitled for any relief. The conduct of the College in this case to mislead this Court for the purpose of getting a favourable order is reprehensible and the College deserves to be dealt with suitably.
- In R. Karuppan, Advocate, In re [R. Karuppan, Advocate, In re, (2001) 5 SCC 289 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 876] , this Court observed as under: (SCC p. 293, para 13)
“13. Courts are entrusted with the powers of dispensation and adjudication of justice of the rival claims of the parties besides determining the criminal liability of the offenders for offences committed against the society. The courts are further expected to do justice quickly and impartially not being biased by any extraneous considerations. Justice-dispensation system would be wrecked if statutory restrictions are not imposed upon the litigants, who attempt to mislead the court by filing and relying upon false evidence particularly in cases, the adjudication of which is dependent upon the statement of facts. If the result of the proceedings is to be respected, these issues before the courts must be resolved to the extent possible in accordance with the truth. The purity of proceedings of the court cannot be permitted to be sullied by a party on frivolous, vexatious or insufficient grounds or relying upon false evidence inspired by extraneous considerations or revengeful desire to harass or spite his opponent. Sanctity of the affidavits has to be preserved and protected discouraging the filing of irresponsible statements, without any regard to accuracy.”
- The brazen manner in which the College has indulged in relying upon manipulated records to mislead this Court for the purpose of getting favourable order deserves to be dealt with in a serious manner. We find that this is a fit case where Mr S.S. Kushwaha, Dean of the College must be held liable for prosecution under Section 193 IPC.
- For the aforementioned reasons, we pass the following order:
20.1. Mr S.S. Kushwaha, Dean of RKDF Medical College Hospital and Research Centre i.e. Petitioner 2 herein is liable for prosecution under Section 193 IPC. The Secretary General of this Court is directed to depute an officer to initiate the prosecution in a competent court having jurisdiction at Delhi.
20.2. The College is barred from making admissions for the first year MBBS course for the next two years i.e. 2018-19 and 2019-2020.
20.3. A penalty of Rs five crores is imposed on the College for playing fraud on this Court. The amount may be paid to the account of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
20.4. The students are entitled to receive the refund of fee paid by them for admission to the College for the academic year 2017-2019. In addition, the College is directed to pay a compensation of Rs one lakh to the said students.”
