Legal commentary supports the CJI’s refusal to meet Opposition leaders over sub judice matters but questions the handling of their written representation; also raises concerns over Justice Dipankar Datta’s meeting with Uddhav Thackeray
Adv. Nilesh Ojha, Chairman of the Rashtriya Sanvidhan Raksha Samiti, explains
Rahul Gandhi’s request for a meeting with Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and the CJI’s subsequent response have sparked legal debate, with a legal commentary questioning whether the constitutional and legal principles involved were adequately addressed.
While supporting the CJI’s decision to decline a meeting concerning matters pending before the Supreme Court, the commentary argues that the written representation submitted by the Opposition leaders could have been considered for appropriate judicial action.
According to a report published by LiveLaw, the CJI responded to official emails from the Leaders of Opposition, stating that such a meeting would be inappropriate because the issues they intended to raise were already sub judice before the Court.
The response reportedly further stated that, under the constitutional framework, the Supreme Court could not interfere with the functioning of the executive on its administrative side. The leaders were, however, free to approach the Court on its judicial side.
Written Representation Could Have Been Considered
The commentary maintains that the refusal to hold a meeting was appropriate and consistent with the law. It contends, however, that a written representation received on the administrative side could potentially be treated as a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution or considered for suo motu cognizance.
In this regard, the commentary refers to the NCERT matter and the case involving Judge Madhu Bala as recent instances in which the CJI exercised suo motu powers.
It further argues that, if the representation was considered frivolous or intended to exert pressure on the Court or prejudice the hearing of a pending matter, the CJI could consider initiating suo motu contempt proceedings against Rahul Gandhi.
In support of this contention, the commentary cites Bal Thackeray v. Pimplekhute, (2005) 1 SCC 254, and Nilesh Navalakha v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 56.
Justice Dipankar Datta’s Meeting with Uddhav Thackeray Questioned
The commentary also raises concerns about compliance with the principle that a judge should not meet a party or a third party in connection with a matter pending before the Court.
In this context, it refers to several judicial decisions, including Re J.R.L.; Ex parte C.J.L., (1986) 162 CLR 342; Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. A.P. State Road Transport Corpn., 1958 SCC OnLine SC 49; State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770; and Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. (Recusal Matter) v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 808.
Drawing a comparison, the commentary refers to an instance in which Justice Dipankar Datta, while serving as Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court, met then Maharashtra Chief Minister Uddhav Thackeray. It further states that Justice Datta subsequently heard cases on the judicial side involving Thackeray and Sanjay Raut.
The commentary characterises Justice Datta’s conduct as contrary to the legal and constitutional principles cited, questioning the meeting in light of the standards governing judicial impartiality and the distinction between judicial and non-judicial interactions.
The concerns raised bring into focus broader questions of judicial propriety, institutional independence and the appropriate manner of addressing representations concerning matters pending before constitutional courts.
