Adv. Nilesh Ojha-Sanvidhani, Chairman , Indian Bar Association.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held, and most recently in M/s Eminent Colonizers Private Limited v. Rajasthan Housing Board & Ors., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 148, that binding precedents constitute legal evidence and an authoritative source of law. The law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution is binding on all courts, authorities, litigants and advocates, and is required to be fairly disclosed, correctly understood and faithfully applied.
On the strength of the aforesaid judgment and various other binding precedents, it is clear that the deliberate suppression of binding authorities operating in favour of the opposite party, concealment of controlling legal precedents, or reliance upon overruled, inapplicable or misleading judgments with a view to obtain a favourable judicial order amounts to suppression, concealment, distortion and tampering with legal evidence. Such conduct may also constitute presentation of false and fabricated legal material before the Court and dishonest assertion of a false claim in judicial proceedings.
It is further settled that where a party or advocate knowingly withholds the governing law and instead presents overruled or inapplicable authorities as representing the correct legal position, the Court is induced to proceed upon a false and incomplete legal foundation. Such conduct strikes at the very root of the administration of justice and attracts the principles relating to fabrication of false evidence, use of false evidence, dishonest concealment of material legal evidence, and dishonest making of false claims before a Court. Consequently, provisions such as Sections 192, 193 and 209 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (corresponding to Sections 228, 229 and 246 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023), apart from other applicable provisions concerning fraud upon the Court, abuse of process, criminal contempt and professional misconduct, may become attracted in an appropriate case.
The Supreme Court has further made it abundantly clear that ignorance of the correct legal position is no defence, particularly for an advocate. An advocate is presumed to know the law and is under a professional and ethical duty to conduct proper legal research, verify whether a judgment continues to hold the field, and ascertain whether it has been overruled, distinguished, diluted or otherwise rendered inapplicable by subsequent binding decisions. In the era of online legal databases and readily available research tools, an advocate cannot legitimately contend that he was unaware of a binding precedent or unaware that a legal proposition relied upon by him had ceased to be good law. Advocates owe a solemn duty of candour to the Court and cannot mislead the Court, whether deliberately or negligently, by suppressing binding precedents or presenting overruled authorities as governing law.
The principle that an advocate cannot escape responsibility for false or misleading pleadings by claiming ignorance of their contents is well established. In Ahmad Ashraf, Vakil v. State, 1926 SCC OnLine All 365, a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court upheld the conviction of a legal practitioner and imposed two separate sentences of five years’ imprisonment each under Sections 193 and 466 IPC, resulting in an aggregate sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. The Court held that where false documents and dishonest statements are filed before a Court with a view to defeat a lawful claim, not only the parties but also the advocate who associates himself with such pleadings may incur criminal liability.
The Court categorically held that when a legal practitioner signs a pleading, it is presumed that he does so with knowledge of its contents. An advocate cannot avoid responsibility by contending that someone else drafted the document and that he merely signed it. By affixing his signature, he adopts and accepts responsibility for every statement contained therein and is bound by all legal consequences arising from it as if he had personally written every word.
The Court further observed that advocates who knowingly associate themselves with dishonest, false or untruthful statements intended to mislead the Court deserve stern action. Such conduct attracts not only criminal liability but also disciplinary consequences, including suspension from practice. The judgment underscores that the duty of candour owed by an advocate to the Court is personal and non-delegable and cannot be avoided by pleading ignorance of the contents of documents filed, signed or relied upon before the Court.
The proposition that advocates are not immune from criminal prosecution for dishonest pleadings, false claims, fabricated evidence, forged documents, suppression of material facts, or collusion with clients to mislead courts is firmly established. In several cases, courts have upheld prosecution, conviction, punishment and disciplinary action against advocates who knowingly participated in filing false pleadings, preparing forged documents, presenting fabricated evidence, making dishonest representations, or otherwise abusing the judicial process.
In Ashok Kumar Sarogi v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 All MR (Cri) 3400; Baduvan Kunhi v. K.M. Abdulla, 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 23602; Silloo Danjishaw Mistri v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 3180; Ranbir Singh v. State, 1990 SCC OnLine Del 40; H.S. Bedi v. National Highways Authority of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 432; P.V.R.S. Manikumar v. Krishna Reddy, 1999 SCC OnLine Mad 107; Ahmad Ashraf, Vakil v. State, 1926 SCC OnLine All 365 (FB); M. Veerabhadra Rao v. Tek Chand, 1984 Supp SCC 571; Kamlakar Bhavsar, 2002 All MR (Cri) 2640; K. Rama Reddy v. State of A.P., 1997 SCC OnLine AP 1210; and Sajid Khan Moyal v. State of Rajasthan, 2014 SCC OnLine Raj 1450, the courts recognized that an advocate who knowingly associates himself with false claims, fabricated evidence, forged documents, dishonest pleadings, suppression of material facts, perjury, or abuse of the judicial process can be proceeded against both criminally and departmentally.
These decisions consistently affirm that an advocate is not a mere mouthpiece of the client. As an officer of the Court, an advocate owes an overriding duty to the administration of justice and cannot knowingly participate in any scheme designed to mislead the Court or secure judicial orders by falsehood, concealment, fabrication, distortion of facts, or suppression of law. Where an advocate crosses the line from professional representation to active participation in fraud upon the Court, the protection ordinarily available to counsel ceases, and the advocate becomes liable to the same criminal, contempt and disciplinary consequences as any other participant in the unlawful conduct.
The consistent judicial view emerging from these authorities is that advocacy does not confer immunity for dishonesty. An advocate who knowingly files, verifies, drafts, signs, relies upon, or assists in presenting false claims, forged documents, fabricated evidence, misleading pleadings, or suppressed material before a Court may be prosecuted, convicted, punished, suspended from practice, removed from the rolls of advocates, or otherwise proceeded against in accordance with law.
Law is also settled that advocates cannot claim ignorance of the correct legal position as a defence. It states that advocates are under a professional duty to verify whether a judgment continues to hold the field and cannot mislead the Court by relying upon authorities that have been overruled, distinguished or rendered inapplicable by subsequent binding decisions.
That the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in R. Muthukrishnan v. High Court of Madras, (2019) 16 SCC 407, has in the clearest and most unequivocal terms emphasized the grave consequences that must follow when an advocate resorts to distorted pleadings, misleading submissions, suppression of truth, or conduct intended to mislead the Court. The Supreme Court observed that the legal profession is a noble profession founded upon integrity, fairness and fidelity to the administration of justice, and that any advocate who indulges in corruption, collusion, dishonesty, false pleadings, manipulation of facts, or abuse of the judicial process strikes at the very foundation of the justice delivery system.
The Hon’ble Court further held that such conduct is not merely professional misconduct but poses a serious threat to the purity and credibility of the judicial institution itself. The Supreme Court observed that advocates who indulge in such unethical practices are “deadwood” in the legal profession and deserve to be “chopped off” so that the justice delivery system is not polluted by their continued presence. The judgment underscores that where an advocate is found guilty of misleading the Court, distorting the record, suppressing material facts or otherwise acting dishonestly, such conduct warrants the severest disciplinary consequences, including suspension or cancellation of the licence to practise, removal from the rolls of advocates, and such other action as may be necessary to preserve the dignity of the profession and the integrity of the administration of justice.
The Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company Limited v. Dolly Satish Gandhi (2026 INSC 498) — a remarkably recent pronouncement — has reaffirmed that the duty of counsel extends to bringing to the Court’s notice all relevant judgments, including those that may not favour their own case, and that “both the Bar and the Bench are responsible for minimising the problems that arise in the face of inconsistent judicial opinion.”
The Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Nalinikanta Muduli*, (2004) 7 SCC 1 held that citing an overruled judgment without disclosing that it has been overruled is “a matter of serious concern and the falling standards of professional ethics”.
The Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v. State of U.P. (2019) 9 SCC 427 has deprecated the practice of citing overruled judgments, observing that it is “unfortunate” that counsel at the Supreme Court level cite judgments that have been overruled.
The Rajasthan High Court in Sajid Khan Moyal v. State of Rajasthan 2014 SCC OnLine Raj 1450 , ruled that the citation of an overruled judgment by counsel amounts to contempt of court.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lal Bahadur Gautam v. State of U.P., (2019) 6 SCC 441, strongly deprecated the practice of relying upon overruled judgments and presenting incorrect legal propositions before courts. The Court emphasized that advocates are under a solemn professional duty to place the correct legal position before the Court and cannot seek judicial orders on the basis of authorities that no longer hold the field. The Supreme Court observed that reliance upon overruled judgments has the tendency to mislead the Court, distort the adjudicatory process and interfere with the proper administration of justice.
Recognizing the seriousness of such conduct, the Supreme Court directed all courts in country to remain vigilant against attempts to secure orders through reliance on overruled or no longer applicable precedents and observed that where such conduct is found, appropriate findings should be recorded against the advocates concerned. The judgment underscores that an advocate is expected to conduct proper legal research, verify the current status of the law, and ensure that the Court is not misled by citation of authorities that have ceased to be good law. The decision reinforces the principle that candour, fairness and fidelity to the law are indispensable obligations of every advocate and that any deliberate departure from these standards strikes at the very foundation of the justice delivery system.
The Bombay High Court in Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. v. ICI India Ltd. 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 74 the Court further observed that advocates owe a duty not to mislead the Court, even inadvertently, and that careful verification of authorities before relying upon them in judicial proceedings forms an integral part of professional responsibility. “The availability of online research databases does not absolve lawyers of their duties as officers of the Court… This pattern of slipshod research is inexcusable.”
The Duty of Senior Advocates as Laid Down by the Supreme Court in a Catena of Decisions .
The Supreme Court’s Settled Mandate — What Senior Advocates Owe the Court– [ Lal Bahadur Gautam Vs. State (2019) 6 SCC 441, State of Orissa Vs. Nalinikanta Muduli (2004) 7 SCC 19, Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha, (2024) 4 SCC 432, ; E.S. Reddi Vs. Chief Secretary, Government of A.P. (1987) 3 SCC 258, Heena Nikhil Dharia Vs. Kokilaben Kirtikumar Nayak and Ors. 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 9859, Badhuvan Kunhi v. K.M. Abdulla, MANU/KE/0828/2016;, Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. v. ICI India Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Born 74, the law laid down in Yatin Narendra Oza v. Suo Motu High Court of Gujarat, 2026 INSC 470, R. Muthukrishnan v. Registrar General, High Court of Madras, (2019) 16 SCC 407, R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106, Court on its own motion v. State and Ors 2009 CRI. L. J. 677, Yatin Narendra Oza Vs High Court of Gujarat, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1004]
The Supreme Court of India, in a long and consistent line of decisions, has imposed upon advocates — and with particular force upon Senior Advocates, by reason of the elevated designation they carry and the heightened trust the court places in them — a set of non-negotiable duties that go to the very integrity of the adversarial system. These duties, as distilled from the catena of Supreme Court decisions on the subject, mandate the following without exception:
First, an advocate — and most particularly a Senior Advocate — must never withhold from the court a binding precedent that is directly relevant to the matter before it, even if that precedent operates against the interests of his own client. The duty of candour to the court is superior to the duty of advocacy for the client. Where these duties conflict, candour prevails.
Second, an advocate must never cite before a court a judgment that has been overruled, declared per incuriam, or superseded by a larger bench — and must never advance arguments that are contrary to binding precedents of the Supreme Court. This prohibition applies whether the misleading of the court is deliberate or accidental. The standard is objective: a Senior Advocate of long standing is imputed with knowledge of the state of the law, and the defence of inadvertence is not available to him.
Third, where an overruling or a contrary precedent is brought to the advocate’s notice — whether by the court, by opposing counsel, or by any other person — the advocate’s duty to correct his submissions and withdraw the overruled authority becomes immediate and absolute. Persistence in relying upon an overruled judgment after its overruling has been pointed out to him is not a professional lapse. It is professional dishonesty.
These duties are not the creation of judicial sentiment. They are the foundation upon which the adversarial system rests — the premise that every court can rely upon the officers who appear before it to assist it honestly in identifying the law, and that no officer will exploit the court’s trust in him to keep it ignorant of authorities that would have changed the outcome.
That the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106, R. Muthukrishnan v. Registrar General, High Court of Madras, (2019) 16 SCC 407, Yatin Narendra Oza v. Suo Motu High Court of Gujarat, 2026 INSC 470, and Yatin Narendra Oza v. High Court of Gujarat, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1004, has repeatedly emphasised that members of the Bar are duty bound to preserve the dignity, authority, and majesty of Courts and that conduct tending to interfere with administration of justice or lower the authority of constitutional courts may warrant serious constitutional, disciplinary, and contempt consequences. The designation of senior counsels was also withdrawn for dishonest conduct like that of Mr. Daurius Khambata.
The proposition that advocates are not immune from criminal prosecution for dishonest pleadings, false claims, fabricated evidence, forged documents, suppression of material facts, or collusion with clients to mislead courts is firmly established. In several cases, courts have upheld prosecution, conviction, punishment and disciplinary action against advocates who knowingly participated in filing false pleadings, preparing forged documents, presenting fabricated evidence, making dishonest representations, or otherwise abusing the judicial process.
In Ashok Kumar Sarogi v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 All MR (Cri) 3400; Baduvan Kunhi v. K.M. Abdulla, 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 23602; Silloo Danjishaw Mistri v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 3180; Ranbir Singh v. State, 1990 SCC OnLine Del 40; H.S. Bedi v. National Highways Authority of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 432; P.V.R.S. Manikumar v. Krishna Reddy, 1999 SCC OnLine Mad 107; Ahmad Ashraf, Vakil v. State, 1926 SCC OnLine All 365 (FB); M. Veerabhadra Rao v. Tek Chand, 1984 Supp SCC 571; Kamlakar Bhavsar, 2002 All MR (Cri) 2640; K. Rama Reddy v. State of A.P., 1997 SCC OnLine AP 1210; and Sajid Khan Moyal v. State of Rajasthan, 2014 SCC OnLine Raj 1450, the courts recognized that an advocate who knowingly associates himself with false claims, fabricated evidence, forged documents, dishonest pleadings, suppression of material facts, perjury, or abuse of the judicial process can be proceeded against both criminally and departmentally.
These decisions consistently affirm that an advocate is not a mere mouthpiece of the client. As an officer of the Court, an advocate owes an overriding duty to the administration of justice and cannot knowingly participate in any scheme designed to mislead the Court or secure judicial orders by falsehood, concealment, fabrication, distortion of facts, or suppression of law. Where an advocate crosses the line from professional representation to active participation in fraud upon the Court, the protection ordinarily available to counsel ceases, and the advocate becomes liable to the same criminal, contempt and disciplinary consequences as any other participant in the unlawful conduct.
The consistent judicial view emerging from these authorities is that advocacy does not confer immunity for dishonesty. An advocate who knowingly files, verifies, drafts, signs, relies upon, or assists in presenting false claims, forged documents, fabricated evidence, misleading pleadings, or suppressed material before a Court may be prosecuted, convicted, punished, suspended from practice, removed from the rolls of advocates, or otherwise proceeded against in accordance with law.
