Complaint to Chief Justice Alleges Petition Was Numbered by the Registry Without Any Affidavit or Affirmation, and Listed Without the Mandatory Consent of the Standing Counsel; Alleges No Valid Authorisation from DHCBA, and Questions Why No Petition Was Filed Against Arvind Kejriwal, Adv. Kapil Sibal and Others for Allegedly More Serious and Aggravated Contempt — Seeks ₹5 Crore Compensation, CBI Probe, and Reference to Bar Council
The complaint states that the Senior Counsel, harbouring personal animosity and labouring under a conflict of interest, relied upon overruled judgments and withheld binding precedents in order to falsely implicate the Complainant — thereby committing the gravest professional misconduct and perpetrating a fraud upon the Court.
Dr. Kapil Kakkar gets Support from Lawyers Across the Country – a large number of advocates from different parts of the country have reportedly come forward to support and represent Dr. Kapil Kakkar in the proceedings before the Delhi High Court.
A contempt proceeding instituted by the Delhi High Court Bar Association (DHCBA) against Dr. Kapil Kakkar has snowballed into a wider controversy, after Dr. Kakkar filed a detailed representation before the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court alleging that the petition against him was procedurally void from inception, selectively pursued, and driven by personal animosity rather than any genuine concern for the dignity of the judiciary.
The Underlying Contempt Case
The Delhi High Court Bar Association (DHCBA) had initiated criminal contempt proceedings against Dr. Dilip Kakkar arising out of an interview in which he allegedly accused Justice Amit Bansal of having failed to act judicially in a matter concerning a dangerous building, the subsequent collapse of which reportedly resulted in the death of eight persons. According to Dr. Kakkar, the criticism related to judicial inaction in a matter where an FIR has since been registered and investigation is ongoing.
The controversy now centers not on the merits of those allegations but on the very maintainability of the contempt proceedings.
Another serious defect highlighted in Dr. Kakkar’s representation concerns the complete absence of any affidavit or verification supporting the contempt petition. Under the Contempt of Courts (Delhi High Court) Rules, 2025, every contempt petition is required to be supported by a duly sworn affidavit and proper verification disclosing the source of information and the person taking responsibility for the allegations made before the Court. However, the DHCBA petition was filed without any affidavit of the petitioner and without any verification by an authorised office-bearer. In J.R. Parashar, Advocate v. Prashant Bhushan, Advocate, AIR 2001 SC 3395, the Supreme Court dealt with a criminal contempt petition suffering from multiple procedural defects, including defects relating to verification, affidavits, and compliance with the governing Rules. Supreme Court had described a similarly defective contempt petition as “shabbily drafted” and said it would have rejected the petition in limine The Supreme Court held that such petitions ought not to have been entertained and should have been rejected at the threshold. The Court also expressed serious concern regarding the manner in which the Registry had processed registered, numbered and listed a petition that was ex facie non-compliant with mandatory requirements.
The petition is also alleged to be defective for having been filed without obtaining the prior written consent of the Standing Counsel (Criminal), as required under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the Contempt of Courts (Delhi High Court) Rules, 2025. Dr. Kakkar’s complaint contends that such a petition is not maintainable and cannot be treated as a valid motion for initiation of criminal contempt proceedings. The Delhi High Court Rules, read with the binding precedents governing the field, require that where a private person seeks to initiate criminal contempt without the requisite consent, the papers are not to be treated as a petition on the judicial side but are required to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice on the administrative side for consideration of whether suo motu action should be initiated. Until such a decision is taken, the complaint asserts, there is no valid contempt petition in the eyes of law capable of being numbered, registered, or listed before a judicial bench.
At the heart of the complaint is the Association’s contention in petition that the Delhi High Court possesses independent constitutional powers under Article 215 of the Constitution to take cognizance of criminal contempt — even without the mandatory prior written consent of the Advocate General as required under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
To buttress this position, the DHCBA and its Senior Counsel placed reliance on two Supreme Court decisions: C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta (1971) 1 SCC 626 and Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P. 1993 Supp (1) SCC 529.
Dr. Kakkar’s application, lays bare what it describes as a “foundational jurisdictional defect” — the petition was filed without the mandatory prior written consent of the Advocate General, a precondition explicitly required under Section 15(1)(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
More critically, the application points out that the judgments relied upon by the DHCBA — C.K. Daphtary and Pritam Pal — no longer hold the field. The proposition that a private party may directly maintain criminal contempt proceedings by invoking Article 215 without complying with Section 15 has been expressly overruled by three binding Supreme Court decisions:
- P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker, (1988) 3 SCC 167
- Bal Thackeray v. Harish Pimpalkhute, (2005) 1 SCC 254
- Biman Basu v. Kallol Guha Thakurta, (2010) 8 SCC 673
These authoritative decisions categorically establish that C.K. Daphtary was decided before the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 came into force and, therefore, cannot govern the issue of maintainability under the present statutory regime. They further make clear that even while exercising jurisdiction under Article 215, the High Court is required to follow the procedure prescribed by the Act.
In Maheshwar Peri v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, (2016) 14 SCC 251, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a criminal contempt petition filed by a private person without obtaining the prior written consent required under Section 15 cannot be treated as a valid application for initiation of contempt proceedings and no cognizance can be taken on such defective petition and no order can be passed. But the question arises as to how such petition got numbered and how it got listed on judicial side for hearing.
Supreme Court Recognizes Binding Precedents as Legal Evidence; Dr. Kapil Kakkar Alleges Suppression of Governing Law and Presentation of Overruled Authorities Attract Offences Relating to False Evidence Under BNS ( sec 192,193 of IPC).
The application argues that once binding precedents are recognized as legal evidence, the deliberate suppression of such precedents, concealment of controlling authorities, or reliance upon overruled and inapplicable judgments amounts to suppression, concealment and distortion of legal evidence before the Court.
According to the application, such conduct attracts the provisions relating to fabrication of false evidence and use of false evidence, including Sections 230 and 231, 246 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Sections 192 and 193 and 209 of the Indian Penal Code), apart from constituting fraud upon the Court, abuse of judicial process and professional misconduct.
The application further contends that advocates cannot claim ignorance of the correct legal position as a defence. It states that advocates are under a professional duty to verify whether a judgment continues to hold the field and cannot mislead the Court by relying upon authorities that have been overruled, distinguished or rendered inapplicable by subsequent binding decisions.
Selective Enforcement: Why Not Kejriwal, Sibbal or Raut?
A recurring theme across both the representation and the earlier public commentary on the matter is the question of selective invocation of contempt jurisdiction. Dr. Kakkar has pointed out that no comparable contempt proceedings were initiated by DHCBA against public figures such as Mr. Arvind Kejriwal, Mr. Kapil Sibal, or Mr. Sanjay Raut, despite allegations that they had made far more sweeping public statements about judges and the entire judiciary as an institution — including remarks reportedly characterising judges as having compromised their independence. By contrast, he notes, it was the Supreme Court itself that took suo motu action in Re: Prashant Bhushan, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 646 — a case the Court itself described as graver than an attack on an individual judge, precisely because it targeted the institution as a whole.
This disparity, the representation argues, is itself a relevant circumstance from which courts have, in other cases, drawn an inference of mala fide intent — citing SNP Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. v. World Tanker Carrier Corporation, 1999 SCC OnLine Bom 584, where a Bombay High Court bench held that selectively proceeding against one party while leaving the actual authors of an alleged libel untouched pointed to a suit filed out of vindictiveness rather than genuine grievance.
Conflict of Interest Allegation Against Senior Advocate Sachin Puri
The representation separately raises an allegation of personal conflict of interest against Senior Advocate Sachin Puri, one of the counsel appearing for DHCBA, alleging a prior adversarial relationship with Dr. Kakkar that was never disclosed to the Court or, he says, to the Association’s own Executive Committee before the proceedings were instituted. The representation also refers to a statement reportedly made by Senior Advocate N. Hariharan in open court — while Dr. Kakkar was present — to the effect that a separate contempt petition would be filed against him “for each day,” which the representation characterises as inconsistent with the detachment expected of counsel as officers of the court.
The Demolition Case and the Pending FIR
The representation also addresses the substance of the underlying allegation against Dr. Kakkar, which it says concerns a single named Judge and an urgent matter involving a building said to be in a dangerous condition. According to the representation, the complaint against the Judge was that he did not act with the urgency the matter required, and that this inaction contributed to the building’s later collapse, in which eight people died. An FIR has been registered in connection with the incident, and investigation is stated to be ongoing. Dr. Kakkar’s position is that, with the matter still under criminal investigation, it cannot presently be said that his allegations are false — and that contempt proceedings initiated while the underlying facts remain under police investigation are, at minimum, premature, citing Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association v. S.C. Sekar, (2009) 2 SCC 784, for the proposition that a contempt petition cannot lie where two views are reasonably possible.
The representation further relies upon the Constitution Bench decision in Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court, (1974) 1 SCC 374, Rama Surat Singh Vs. Shiv Kumar Pandey 1969 SCC OnLine All 226, to contend that contempt jurisdiction cannot be invoked in a manner that has the effect of deterring citizens from making bona fide complaints against judges or exposing alleged misconduct. The complaint asserts that if every criticism, complaint, or allegation against a Judge were to invite contempt action, it would create a chilling effect upon citizens seeking accountability and would discourage genuine grievances from being brought before lawful authorities. According to Dr. Kakkar, the Constitution Bench cautioned that the law of contempt is intended to protect the administration of justice and not to shield judges from scrutiny, criticism, or complaints made through lawful means. The representation therefore contends that initiation of contempt proceedings merely because a citizen has made allegations against a Judge, particularly where the underlying facts are already the subject matter of a pending investigation, would be contrary to the constitutional principles emphasised in Baradakanta Mishra and would risk creating fear among citizens in pursuing legitimate complaints against public officials, including members of the judiciary.
The Reliefs Sought
The representation to the Chief Justice seeks, among other things:
- An enquiry into how the petition came to be registered, numbered and listed despite the alleged defects;
- Suo motu cognizance or a reference to the Supreme Court regarding the alleged disregard of binding directions in Anil Kumar Gupta;
- Withdrawal of the Senior Advocate designation of Mr. N. Hariharan, Mr. Rakesh Tiku and Mr. Sachin Puri;
- Initiation of criminal proceedings against those allegedly responsible for processing the petition, invoking provisions including Sections 166, 219, 220, 120-B, 107 and 34 IPC;
- Compensation and exemplary costs of approximately ₹5 crore, relying on the costs awarded in Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan University v. Union of India, (2019) 14 SCC 761, and on the line of authority — including McLeod v. St. Aubyn [1899] AC 549, Parashuram Detaram Shamdasani v. R. [1945] AC 264, and Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj v. Attorney General of Trinidad & Tobago, (1978) 2 WLR 902 — holding that the State may be directed to compensate a citizen wrongfully subjected to contempt proceedings, with liberty to recover the amount from the officials found responsible;
- A reference to the Bar Council for examination of alleged professional misconduct.
A Wider Debate on Professional Accountability
According to the earlier press coverage of the matter, the case has drawn an unusual degree of attention from the Bar, with advocates from across the country reportedly extending support to Dr. Kakkar — attention legal commentators attribute less to the individual dispute than to the broader questions it raises: the duty of candour owed by counsel to disclose binding precedent even when it cuts against their own client, the consequences of relying on judgments that have been overruled, and the procedural safeguards meant to prevent contempt jurisdiction — a quasi-criminal power — from being invoked without the statutory checks Parliament built into Section 15 of the 1971 Act.
The Supreme Court’s recent observations in New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Dolly Satish Gandhi, 2026 INSC 498, are being cited in this context for the proposition that both Bar and Bench share responsibility for ensuring that the law placed before a court is current and complete — a principle now squarely at the centre of the dispute over Dr. Kakkar’s contempt case.
The Larger Question: Who Guards the Guardians?
This case raises a question of profound institutional importance: what happens when a Bar Association, the very body charged with upholding professional ethics and the rule of law, is itself accused to have relied upon judgments that no longer represent the law of the land?
The Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company Limited v. Dolly Satish Gandhi (2026 INSC 498) — a remarkably recent pronouncement — has reaffirmed that the duty of counsel extends to bringing to the Court’s notice all relevant judgments, including those that may not favour their own case, and that “both the Bar and the Bench are responsible for minimising the problems that arise in the face of inconsistent judicial opinion.”
As the matter proceeds before the Delhi High Court, it is expected to generate significant debate on the standards of professional responsibility expected of Bar Associations and Senior Advocates, the mandatory nature of procedural compliance under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and the rights of an individual accused of criminal contempt to a fair, independent, and constitutionally compliant prosecution.
Senior Counsel’s Professional Conduct Under the Scanner
The application pulls no punches in its critique of the professional conduct of the Senior Counsel appearing for the DHCBA. Citing a battery of Supreme Court decisions, it argues that an advocate — and particularly a designated Senior Advocate — is under an unqualified duty to ensure that no overruled judgment is placed before the Court.
The Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Nalinikanta Muduli*, (2004) 7 SCC 1 held that citing an overruled judgment without disclosing that it has been overruled is “a matter of serious concern and the falling standards of professional ethics”.
The Supreme Court in Raj Kumar v. State of U.P. (2019) 9 SCC 427 has deprecated the practice of citing overruled judgments, observing that it is “unfortunate” that counsel at the Supreme Court level cite judgments that have been overruled.
The Rajasthan High Court in Sajid Khan Moyal v. State of Rajasthan 2014 SCC OnLine Raj 1450 , ruled that the citation of an overruled judgment by counsel amounts to contempt of court.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lal Bahadur Gautam v. State of U.P., (2019) 6 SCC 441, strongly deprecated the practice of relying upon overruled judgments and presenting incorrect legal propositions before courts. The Court emphasized that advocates are under a solemn professional duty to place the correct legal position before the Court and cannot seek judicial orders on the basis of authorities that no longer hold the field. The Supreme Court observed that reliance upon overruled judgments has the tendency to mislead the Court, distort the adjudicatory process and interfere with the proper administration of justice.
Recognizing the seriousness of such conduct, the Supreme Court directed all courts in country to remain vigilant against attempts to secure orders through reliance on overruled or no longer applicable precedents and observed that where such conduct is found, appropriate findings should be recorded against the advocates concerned. The judgment underscores that an advocate is expected to conduct proper legal research, verify the current status of the law, and ensure that the Court is not misled by citation of authorities that have ceased to be good law. The decision reinforces the principle that candour, fairness and fidelity to the law are indispensable obligations of every advocate and that any deliberate departure from these standards strikes at the very foundation of the justice delivery system.
The Bombay High Court in Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. v. ICI India Ltd. 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 74 the Court further observed that advocates owe a duty not to mislead the Court, even inadvertently, and that careful verification of authorities before relying upon them in judicial proceedings forms an integral part of professional responsibility. “The availability of online research databases does not absolve lawyers of their duties as officers of the Court… This pattern of slipshod research is inexcusable.”
The Duty of Senior Advocates as Laid Down by the Supreme Court in a Catena of Decisions .
The Supreme Court’s Settled Mandate — What Senior Advocates Owe the Court– [ Lal Bahadur Gautam Vs. State (2019) 6 SCC 441, State of Orissa Vs. Nalinikanta Muduli (2004) 7 SCC 19, Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha, (2024) 4 SCC 432, ; E.S. Reddi Vs. Chief Secretary, Government of A.P. (1987) 3 SCC 258, Heena Nikhil Dharia Vs. Kokilaben Kirtikumar Nayak and Ors. 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 9859, Badhuvan Kunhi v. K.M. Abdulla, MANU/KE/0828/2016; Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. v. ICI India Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Born 74, the law laid down in Yatin Narendra Oza v. Suo Motu High Court of Gujarat, 2026 INSC 470, R. Muthukrishnan v. Registrar General, High Court of Madras, (2019) 16 SCC 407, R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106, Court on its own motion v. State and Ors 2009 CRI. L. J. 677, Yatin Narendra Oza Vs High Court of Gujarat, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1004]
The Supreme Court of India, in a long and consistent line of decisions, has imposed upon advocates — and with particular force upon Senior Advocates, by reason of the elevated designation they carry and the heightened trust the court places in them — a set of non-negotiable duties that go to the very integrity of the adversarial system. These duties, as distilled from the catena of Supreme Court decisions on the subject, mandate the following without exception:
First, an advocate — and most particularly a Senior Advocate — must never withhold from the court a binding precedent that is directly relevant to the matter before it, even if that precedent operates against the interests of his own client. The duty of candour to the court is superior to the duty of advocacy for the client. Where these duties conflict, candour prevails.
Second, an advocate must never cite before a court a judgment that has been overruled, declared per incuriam, or superseded by a larger bench — and must never advance arguments that are contrary to binding precedents of the Supreme Court. This prohibition applies whether the misleading of the court is deliberate or accidental. The standard is objective: a Senior Advocate of long standing is imputed with knowledge of the state of the law, and the defence of inadvertence is not available to him.
Third, where an overruling or a contrary precedent is brought to the advocate’s notice — whether by the court, by opposing counsel, or by any other person — the advocate’s duty to correct his submissions and withdraw the overruled authority becomes immediate and absolute. Persistence in relying upon an overruled judgment after its overruling has been pointed out to him is not a professional lapse. It is professional dishonesty.
These duties are not the creation of judicial sentiment. They are the foundation upon which the adversarial system rests — the premise that every court can rely upon the officers who appear before it to assist it honestly in identifying the law, and that no officer will exploit the court’s trust in him to keep it ignorant of authorities that would have changed the outcome.
That the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106, R. Muthukrishnan v. Registrar General, High Court of Madras, (2019) 16 SCC 407, Yatin Narendra Oza v. Suo Motu High Court of Gujarat, 2026 INSC 470, and Yatin Narendra Oza v. High Court of Gujarat, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1004, has repeatedly emphasised that members of the Bar are duty bound to preserve the dignity, authority, and majesty of Courts and that conduct tending to interfere with administration of justice or lower the authority of constitutional courts may warrant serious constitutional, disciplinary, and contempt consequences. The designation of senior counsels was also withdrawn for dishonest conduct like that of Mr. Daurius Khambata.
That the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in R. Muthukrishnan v. High Court of Madras, (2019) 16 SCC 407, has in the clearest and most unequivocal terms laid down the legal consequences that must visit an advocate who resorts to distorted pleadings, fabricated allegations, to misled the courts. The Hon’ble Court held that an advocate who makes distorted pleadings and engages in corruption and collusion in defaming a Judge commits the most sinister and damaging act that can be done to the entire legal system, and that such a person is “deadwood” who deserves to be chopped off — that is, removed permanently from the noble profession of advocacy by cancellation of his licence to practise and sanad.
In the case of Roma Ahuja Vs The State And Anr, 2026 INSC 336 it is ruled as under;
“8. As disclosure of honest and full facts before the Court is part of the fair conduct on the part of lawyers, respecting the binding precedence of the judgments and conceding its applicability in a case is also a duty in fairness to be discharged by the advocates in conducting their case. They are part of the system of administration of justice and are not expected to breach the rules of the game to argue against settled principles or contrary to well settled law, just for the sake of doing it. Giving up an argument where a point of law is already decided is a professional virtue. It is part of ethics in professional conduct before the Court.
8.1 As the courts are bound by the law of precedent and to follow the law laid down in the binding judgment of the Constitution Bench, the lawyers are also expected to respect the strong-operated precedent emanating from a judgment holding the field unless exceptional grounds exist to distinguish the decision are available. Merely for the purpose of demonstrating the argumentative skill, the Criminal Appeals @ SLP(Crl) No.9971-9972/2025 Page 27 of 29 lawyers ought not to eat up the valuable public time of the court by making the submissions, which are worthless against binding precedent.”
In New India Assurance Company Limited vs. Dolly Satish Gandhi & Anr. 2026 INSC 498, it is ruled as under;
“14. When considering these issues, the roles both the Bar and the Bench must be addressed. Counsel appearing in Court to plead the case of a particular party making all effort possible, while balancing ethics and their duty towards the Court, to secure a victory for their clients. It is this duty towards the Court which requires them to bring to the Court’s notice judgments both that aid their case and also those that do not. It is here that the counsel’s awareness of law and grasp on facts are their greatest assets, enabling them to distinguish judgments that may seemingly be against them and still secure a favourable order. This duty is all the more important in the present day because all the Courts are polyvocal. Tens of orders and judgments are pronounced every day across a range of issues and so, the Court before which they are appearing may not be aware of the latest pronouncement. They must disclose the same to the Court ensuring consistency. …. So, in essence, both the Bar and the Bench are responsible for minimising the problems that arise in the face of inconsistent judicial opinion. They are both constituents of the justice delivery system, and all actions must be guided by a sense of service to the system, further facilitating reduction of pendency.”
Dr. Kapil Kakkar gets Support from Lawyers Across the Country
In what several legal observers are describing as an unusual and significant show of professional solidarity, a large number of advocates from different parts of the country have reportedly come forward to support and represent Dr. Kapil Kakkar in the proceedings before the Delhi High Court.
According to sources associated with the matter, the growing support stems from the serious legal and ethical issues raised in Dr. Kakkar’s complaint application, particularly the allegations relating to maintainability of the contempt proceedings, suppression of binding precedents, reliance upon overruled authorities, prosecutorial fairness, and compliance with the Contempt of Courts (Delhi High Court) Rules, 2025. Several members of the legal fraternity are stated to be closely watching the outcome of the case because of its potential implications for contempt jurisprudence and professional accountability within the legal system.
Legal commentators observe that it is uncommon for a contempt proceeding to generate such widespread interest among members of the Bar. According to some observers, the matter has become larger than an individual dispute and has evolved into a broader debate concerning professional ethics, duties owed by advocates to the Court, disclosure of binding precedents, and adherence to procedural safeguards in quasi-criminal proceedings.
Some supporters of Dr. Kakkar have also expressed the view that the case has provided an opportunity for scrutiny of the conduct of influential members of the Bar and for examination of grievances that, according to them, have remained unaddressed for a considerable period. These views, however, remain matters of opinion and have not been adjudicated by any court.
Legal observers further note the unusual nature of the controversy, pointing out that the proceedings involve allegations against a Bar Association in a matter concerning contempt jurisdiction—a legal mechanism traditionally invoked for protection of the authority and dignity of the judicial institution. According to commentators, the outcome of the proceedings may have important ramifications for the relationship between Bar Associations, members of the Bar, and the administration of justice.
As the matter proceeds, it is expected to attract continued attention from lawyers, legal scholars and court-watchers across the country because of the broader questions it raises concerning procedural fairness, professional responsibility, and the proper exercise of contempt jurisdiction.
It is also being widely discussed within sections of the legal fraternity that the present proceedings have prompted many advocates, who allegedly harbour longstanding grievances against Senior Advocate Hariharan and Senior Advocate Sachin Puri, to openly support Dr. Kakkar’s challenge. many advocates who believe themselves to have been unfairly treated, sidelined, or adversely affected by the actions and conduct of Senior Advocates Hariharan and Sachin Puri now view the present proceedings as an opportunity to challenge what they perceive as long-standing grievances. While such perceptions remain matters of opinion, they are said to have contributed to the unusually broad support being extended to Dr. Kakkar from members of the Bar across different jurisdictions. According to several commentators, this unusual reversal has transformed the case into a broader debate on professional accountability, ethical advocacy and fidelity to binding precedent within the legal system.
The matter is pending consideration before the Delhi High Court and the office of the Chief Justice. Further developments are awaited.
